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ABSTRACT

This thesis critically examines the origins and development of international criminal law
to identify the defining features of this emerging legal tradition. It critically evaluates the
experimental approach taken in Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, which attempts to codify an untested normative super-structure to guide
this legal tradition.

International criminal law is a hybrid tradition which seeks legitimacy and answers to
difficult questions by drawing on other established legal traditions. Its development at the
confluence of public international law, international humanitarian law, international
human rights law and national criminal laws has resulted in gaps in difficult cases with no
clear answers.

These lacunae have been filled by recourse to judicial discretion,

exercised consistent with Patrick Glenn's the ory of transnational common laws, and by
privileging one of the competing aims of international criminal law: enhancing
humanitarian protection versus maximizing fairness to the accused.

1V

ABRÉG É
Cette thèse porte un regard critique sur les origines et le développement du droit pénal
international afin de mieux cerner les éléments caractéristiques de cette tradition juridique
émergente. Il s'agit d'une évaluation critique de l'approche expérimentale proposée par
l'Article 21 du Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale Internationale, qui vise à codifier une
superstructure normative innovante afin de mieux asseoir cette tradition juridique.

Le droit pénal international est une tradition hybride qui cherche une légitimité et qui
cherche à apporter des réponses à des questions complexes en s'inspirant d'autres
traditions juridiques établies. Son développement à la confluence du droit international
public, du droit international humanitaire, des droits de l'homme et des législations
pénales nationales, a abouti dans certains cas à un vide juridique et des réponses
imprécises. Ces lacunes ont été comblées par le recours au pouvoir de discrétion
judiciaire, exercé selon la théorie de droit communs transnationaux avancée par Patrick
Glenn. Elles ont également été comblées en privilégiant l'un des deux objectifs mis en
concurrence par le droit pénal international, à savoir privilégier la protection humanitaire
ou renforcer le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable.

v

INTRODUCTION
International criminal law has only recently emerged as an independent field of study,
practiced by few but closely watched by many. Today, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) is an ambitious project that raises complex questions that legal practitioners and
scholars are only beginning to appreciate.

While the path towards a permanent

international criminal court was long, the haste with which the Rome Statute creating the
ICC was negotiated leaves lingering concerns about whether this infant institution will be
able to achieve the lofty aims of its framers. Foundational to the legitimacy and viability
of this judicial institution is the way that it recognizes, interprets and applies norms and
rules in the still developing area of international criminallaw.

This thesis aIms to critically examme the historical ongms and contemporary
development of international criminal law to identify the defining features of this
emergent legal tradition, and to evaluate the new approach taken in Article 21 of the
Rome Statute of the ICC in attempting to codify a normative super-structure to guide this
legal tradition moving forward. This inquiry involves the most practical of substantive,
procedural and evidentiary issues, as weIl as the most theoretical questions related to the
nature of law and judicial decision-making.

It will be argued that international criminallaw is a hybrid tradition in which the constant

tension between divergent sources of law are resolved in difficult cases not by resorting to
well-established doctrines of public international law as often claimed, but rather by
judicial discretion. This discretion is often exercised in a manner which is consistent with
Patrick Glenn' s theory of transnational common laws which posits that persuasive, non-
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binding norms that transcend national laws operate in the background and may be drawn
upon to address gaps in applicable law. This thesis will further argue that one of the
principal persuasive reasons for opting to follow one transnational common law over
another is based on favoring one of the fundamental tensions in the international criminal
law tradition (e.g. humanitarian protection versus fairness to the accused). In the final
analysis, it will be submitted that Article 21 of the Rome Statute, which purports to define
'applicable law' for resolving questions of international criminallaw, carries the serious
risk of being indeterminate, and inconsistently applied by authorizing the possibility of
different norms applying to different accused - a troubling concept in criminal
proceedings. It also opens the door wide open to judicial activism in ways not fully
appreciated by the negotiators of the Rome Statute who generally intended to limit the
scope of judge-made law in comparison to the legacy and modern ad hoc tribunals.

In Chapter 1, the origins of the international criminallaw tradition will be explored up to
the end of the post-WWII period. This analysis will focus on how this tradition has
struggled to define its sources of law and methods of interpretation, as weIl as the impact
of institutional design on the development of this tradition. Some of the early defining
features of this tradition will be identified so that their growth or decline may be more
fully understood as the tradition's progress is tracked.

Chapter 2 will critically examine the development of the international criminal law
tradition at the modern ad hoc tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
The ability of these tribunals to identify applicable sources of law in difficult cases, and to
2
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deal with fundamental tensions in this legal tradition, will be examined. An analysis of
the jurisprudence of these tribunal s, where gaps in the applicable law have arisen, will be
undertaken in order to identify the theoretical means by which this legal tradition has
sought to reconcile competing sources of law from different legal traditions. Patrick
Glenn' s theory of transnational common laws will be introduced as offering a persuasive
explanatory the ory for the actual operation of judicial decision-making in difficult cases
before these tribunals.

Finally, Chapter 3 will apply these historical and contemporary insights to the applicable
lawand institutional design of the ICC as the first permanent international criminal court
and sustainer of this legal tradition moving forward. For the first time in history, Article
21 of the Rome Statute of the ICC purports to delimit the sources of international criminal
law in an international treaty. The provision is not the progeny of the common law,
civilian or public international law traditions entirely, despite drawing sorne inspiration
from them. Rather, it is an untested and theoretically incoherent new articulation ofwhat
law is and how it may be found. As with any legal order, Article 21 claims to offer an
answer to questions that are not addressed in formaI legal sources (i.e. the Rome Statute,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Elements of Crime, and relevant treaties). Given that
the ICC is an adjudicative body without a complete code to apply, there must be answers
to questions unaddressed in these formaI sources - but where do they come from, and
how will judges go about finding them? Does Article 21 of the Rome Statute pro vide a
sufficient basis for determining practical matters that will come before the ICC, and, more
fundamentally, does it provide an underlying structure for an international criminal law
tradition? These are the questions that this final analysis will aim to address. They have

3
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far reaching implications for the future of international criminal law and its promise to
seek justice for serious violations of international humanitarian law.

4

CHAPTER

1

Origins of the International Criminal Law Tradition: Post-WWII

Crimes against international law are committed f?y men, not f?y abstract
entities, and on!J f?y punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of internationallaw be enforced.
- Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1946 1

Understanding the genesis of international criminal law is important for several reasons.
First, it offers insights into why such a tradition became possible in the course of human
history. Secondly, it demonstrates why this tradition has struggled to define its sources of
law and methods of interpretation - a fundamental challenge which still troubles it today.
Finally, it shows how the institutional structure in which international criminal law
developed was sufficient to bring it into existence, but inadequate to provide for its
ongoing normative application until subsequent historical events again made it necessary
to nurture this infant tradition.

Before the Tradition Emerged
For thousands ofyears, customary rules have regulated the means and methods ofwarfare
in various parts of the world. With only the rarest of exceptions, violations of such rules
have been tried before national courts or military tribunals,2 applying national

1 United States of America et al. v. Hermann Wilhelm Goring et al., Trials of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, Judgement: The Law of
the Charter, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlimt/proc/judlawch.htm> [IMT
Judgement].

2 Richard May & Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Ardsley, NY: Transnational
Publishers, 2002) at 3 [May & Wierda, 2002]. The exception here is the trial of von Hagenbach in 1474
who was tried for violating that 'laws of God and man' by twenty-eight judges from 'allied towns': see
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substantive, procedural and evidentiary law.

The laws of war were largely seen as

directed to the parties of such conflicts and, in the Westphalian system, specifically to
States themselves as opposed to individuals. Gradually, individual military officiaIs and
sol di ers could theoretically be held accountable for violating such laws, often due to
codification in national military codes and manuals. The need to ensure discipline in
professional armies offered a strong impetus for such practices, rather than the
humanitarian concerns which would come to a fore during the bloody conflicts of the
nineteenth century.

Many generals of this era, however, like Field-Marshal-General

Count von Moltke, disputed the enforceability of the rules of international humanitarian
law at the internationallevel:
Every law presupposes an authority to superintend and direct its execution, and
international conventions are supported by no such authority. What neutral States would
ever take up arms for the sole reason that, two Powers being at war, the 'laws ofwar' had
been violated by one or both of the belligerents? For offences of that sort there is no

earthly judge[.]3

Indeed, before 1945, "violations of international law and State practices during warfare
were mainly dealt with by either military tribunals, which possessed limited jurisdiction,
or in exceptional cases, by domestic courtS.,,4 .

The widespread ratification of several international treaties late in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries which codified, in part, and also further developed customary
ibid, nA. See Jordan 1. Paust, "History ofInternational Tribunals Prior to Nuremberg: Selective History of
International Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nuremberg" (2003) 10 ILSA 1. Int'l & Comp. L. 207 at 207209.
Field-Marshal-General Count von Moltke in a letter to Professor 1.K. Bluntschli, Il December 1880,
Holland, Letters on War and Neutrality (1914) at 25 cited in Sheldon Glueck, War Criminals: Their
Prosecution & Punishment (New York: Alred A. Knopf, 1944) at 2 [emphasis added].
3

Claire de Than & Edwin Shorts, International Criminal Law and Human Rights (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2003) at 271 [de Than & Shorts].

4
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international humanitarian law,5 provided an internationally accepted normative
framework that would only later be called upon, in conjunction with the peace treaties of
the inter-World War period, as the substantive law foundation of an international criminal
law tradition. Writing in 1944, Sheldon Glueck described this body of norms "as yet as
undeveloped as was the early English common law.,,6

While an international criminallaw tradition had not yet emerged prior to 1945, it can be
seen as the descendent of two conventionally distinct systems of law. Cherif Bassiouni
describes international criminal law as the "convergence of the international aspects of
municipal criminal law and the criminal aspects of international law.

Its origin and

emergence must, therefore, be traced through these two branches of law, even though it is
emerging as a discipline in its own right.,,7

According to Bassiouni, this has given

international criminal law a '''split personality' which has plagued its development".8
Sorne of these tensions are clear from an account of the aborted attempt to bring
international criminallaw into existence in the wake of the brutality of World War 1.

A False Start at Leipzig

For an extensive list of such sources, from the Resolutions of the Geneva International Conference,
Geneva, 26-29 October 1863 to The Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, see
International Committee of the Red Cross, "Treaties and Documents by Date", online: ICRC
<http://www.icrc.org>. For adoption in national military manuals, see, e.g., Instructionsfor the Government
of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863, online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org> [Lieber
Code]; Prussia (Kingdom), War Book of the German General Staff(Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books,
2005), translated by J.H. Morgan, originally published in 1915.
5

6

Glueck, supra note 3 at 98.

M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Law: A Draft International Criminal Code (Germantown,
MY: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980) at 2 [Bassiouni, 1980].

7

8

Ibid at 19.
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The emergence of an international criminallaw tradition got a false start after World War
1. To begin with, there was sharp disagreement among the Allied powers, which hailed

from a diversity of legal traditions themselves, about what law an international tribunal
should apply to prosecute German officiaIs for their conduct during the war, and whether
individuals could even be prosecuted for violations of the laws of war by an international
tribunal.

The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authon, of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties (Commission)9 recommended that an international tribunal prosecute WWI war
criminals and apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of
public conscience."lO lronically, the Japanese delegation (then a member of the Allies)
challenged the entire exercise of putting individuals who violated the laws of war on trial
at an, asking "whether international law recognizes a penal law as applicable to those
who are guilty."ll

The Martens Clause as a Source rif International Criminal Law
The Commission members were Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Serbia, United
Kingdom, United States: Paust, supra note 2 at 208.

9

10 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties, (1920) 14
Am. J. Int. L. 95 at 122 [WWI Commission] cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 22.
Il WWI Commission, supra note 10 cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 23. Subsequently after WWII at the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (lMTFE) trial, only Judge Pal (India) "would have acquitted
aIl the defendants on the ground that there had been no individual criminal responsibility under
internationallaw": Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001) at 20.

8
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By referring to the 'laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience', the
post-WWI Commission was indirectly attempting to incorporate the Martens Clause,
named after the Russian delegate who first proposed it at the Hague Peace Conference in
1899, as an independent source oflaw. The Martens Clause stated:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties
think it right to de clare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them,
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations,
from the laws of hum an ity and the requirements ofpublic conscience. 12

Theodor Meron has described the Martens Clause as having "originated as supplementary
or residual protection, based on sources of morality and law, pending a comprehensive
codification of the laws of war.,,13

As international humanitarian law became

increasingly codified, the Martens Clause was recognized as a "powerful vehicle" for
advancing humanitarian concerns, enabling the "dynamic development" of international
humanitarian law, which made "clear that written humanitarian law could develop only
gradually and to show there was a common law that must be respected.,,14

However, after WWI, the D.S. rejected the Martens Clause as a source of international
criminallaw. While the American representative to the Commission was willing to hold
individuals responsible for violations of the laws and customs of war at the international
level, he issued a reservation rejecting the Martens Clause as a source of law to be
applied, stating: "the laws and customs of war are a standard certain to be found in books
of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with
12 Cited in Theodor Meron, "The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience" (2000) 94 Amer. J. Int'l L. 78 at 79 [emphasis added].
13

Ibid at 79 [emphasis added].

14

Ibid at 81,86,88 [emphasis added].
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the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a
court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminallaw."l5 This
statement reveals two paradoxical assumptions that still underlie international criminal
law: the need for liberal enforcement of humanitarian norms on one hand, and the
requirement of a fair trial on the other. lndeed, this early controversy surrounding the
Martens Clause as a source of international criminallaw has continued to the present day,
such that "[g]overnments are not yet ready to transform broad principles of humanity and
dictates of public conscience into binding law."l6 For example, the V.S. Department of
Army has stated that the Martens Clause is "in reality a reliance upon moral law and
public opinion."l7 However, as will be seen in Chapter 2, the Martens Clause has played
a role in extending humanitarian protection at the modem ad hoc tribunals.

The significance of discarding the Martens Clause as a source of international criminal
law at this point in history has had several implications for this emerging tradition. First,
it has meant that the substantive body of norms in this tradition exhibited a strong
tendency towards positivism. Secondly, the participants in generating norms within the
tradition are largely States, as opposed to individuals or other non-State actors including
non-State belligerents, non-governmental organizations, and so on.

Third, since the

Martens Clause embodies decidedly progressive humanitarian ideals that would have
broadened the scope of substantive criminal liability, its questionable place in
international criminal law signaIs a tendency towards the criminal law lineage within

15

WWI Commission, supra note 10 cited in Glueck, supra note 3 at 22.

16

Meron, supra note 12 at 88.

17

Ibid. at 88.
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international criminallaw. Finally, although formally rejected as an independent source
of law, the Martens Clause continues to have sorne normative force, affecting beliefs
about change in the international criminal law tradition by extending liability to more
gradually enhance humanitarian protection. As will be discussed later in Chapter 3,
similar issues have arisen with international human rights law being indirectly,18 and now
directly infused in Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, to progressively change
the international criminal law tradition, undermining positivism and State-control of this
tradition.

Existing Traditions Entrenched: National Trials under National Law

When it became clear that international trials of WWI war criminals did not have the
support of the German authorities, despite their obligations under the Treaty of
Versailles,19 the Allies agreed to assist with domestic prosecutions by German authorities
at Leipzig. In preparing these cases for trial, the United Kingdom reportedly prepared
cases against accused they had named according to English standards of proof and
evidence.

Observing this phenomenon, commentators have stated "why the highly

technical rules of evidence and standards of proof required in Anglo-American jury trials
were deemed necessary in view of the fact that the accused were to be tried in German
courts, under German law, and before appraisers of fact who where not laymen but
trained jurists, is not clear.,,2o In the end, the Criminal Senate of the Reich Court of
Justice at Leipzig applied the German Military Penal Code and Reich Penal Code in
18 See Richard May & Marieke Wierda, "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo,
The Hague, and Arusha" (1999) 37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 725 at 732-3, 764 [May & Wierda, 1999].
19

Treaty a/Versailles, 28 June 1919, arts. 227-8 reproduced in Paust, supra note 2 at 211.

20

Glueck, supra note 3 at 31.
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trying twelve accused (convicting six of them) from the originallist of 896 submitted for
prosecution by the Allies?1 These questionable prosecutions based on nationallaw in a
national court meant that the potential advent of an international criminal law tradition
was delayed, if only for a brief time, until even larger-scale horrors during war would
renew the caU for its birth.

Nuremberg as the 'Birth Certificate' of International Criminal Law
Heiko Ahlbrecht has called the Nuremberg Charter, signed by the Allied powers in 1945
and subsequently endorsed by nineteen other States,22 the "birth certificate of
international criminal law".23

The characterization is not an exaggeration, since the

Nuremberg Charter meant that "for the first time individuals were held accountable, not
only for specific war infringements contrary to international humanitarian law, but also
for conduct amounting to crimes against humanity.

AIso, for the first time precise

definitions, in so far as it was possible to do so, were set out".24

Indeed, after the

International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg had rendered its judgments, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted Resolution 95(1) on Il December 1946 which affirmed "the
principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and

21 Ibid. at 28. Nevertheless, there was limited reference by the German court to violations "of the law of
nations" in their judgments: ibid., at 104.

In addition to Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, the Nuremberg Charter was
endorsed by Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia: Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 18.
22

23 Heiko Ahlbrecht, "Foundations" in Gerhard Werle, ed., Principles of International Criminal Law (The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005) 1 at 6.
24

de Than & Shorts, supra note 4 at 273.
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the judgment of the Tribunal".25 Others have not been so gracious in their description,
calling the Nuremberg proceedings "an experiment, almost an improvisation.,,26

However, a historical analysis ofthe IMT and Control Council Law No. 1027 proceedings
shows that the formallaw set out in their constituting statutes failed to sufficiently delimit
the minimally required sources of law to be relied upon.

As a result, the early

development of international criminallaw was stunted and lacked coherence. Contrary to
sorne academic commentary,28 these post-WWII tribunals concerned themselves with
more than just American criminallaw, although it was very prominent. While U.S. law
featured heavily and was the basis for including conspiracy as a mode of liability in the
Nuremberg Charter, Soviet positions on international humanitarian law were also
important in sorne areas, as were civilian approaches to evidentiary matters. In answering
questions unaddressed in the formaI law of the IMT and Control Council Law No. 10
Military Tribunals, resort was frequently had to the common law, such as articulating
fundamental rights of the accused in Farben, discussed below.

However, there are

instances in which such open legal questions were resolved by considering common law
and civilian systems alike (as in Krupp regarding trials in absentia of mentally
incapacitated accused, discussed below), and German military law (as in Einsatzgruppen,
discussed below). In at least one case, however, Defence Counsel was ridiculed for
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal,
GA Res. 95(I), Il December 1946.

25

26 Richard Overy, "The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making" in Philippe Sands, ed., From
Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future ofInternational Criminal Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003) 1 at 2.

27 The Nuremberg system encompassed both the IMT and other subsequent Military Tribunals acting under
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, which tried lesser Nazi war criminals.
28

Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 44.
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relying on the domestic criminallaw of the Allied powers in aid of their Nazi defendants
(as in Einsatzgruppen, discussed below).

An International Criminal Trial without an International Criminal Law
Putting Axis war criminals on trial before an international tribunal was first seriously
advanced at the Allies' Moscow Conference in 1943. 29 Before the signing of the London
Agreement and Nuremberg Charter in 1945, there was debate in the legal community as
to whether and on what basis Axis war criminals could be tried by an international
tribunal. Given that State responsibility is the usual me ans to enforce public international
law, this body of law contained no obvious rules to be applied in the criminal prosecution
of individuals for violations of it.

With respect to substantive law, while international humanitarian law proscribed certain
me ans and methods of warfare, which of these should entail individual criminal
responsibility? What modes of liability were possible (e.g. in addition to individual
perpetration and command responsibility, what of aiding and abetting, incitement,
conspiracy, complicity, etc.)? Was an inquisitorial or adversarial mode of trial to be used?
What rules of procedure and evidence were to be applied given that the major legal
traditions of the world varied widely? Who would be the judges or jury and in what
structure of court system?

How can there be an international judiciary without an

However, as late as October 1944, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill suggested that "it should not
be assumed that the procedure of trial will necessarily be adopted": Glueck, supra note 3 at 10 [emphasis
added]. During the war, British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, reiterated the calI for summary execution
of the se Nazi leaders, stating: "The guilt of such individuals is so black that they faIl outside and go beyond
the scope ofany judicial process": Overy, supra note 26 at 3. In the end, however, strange bedfeIlows of
'Soviet lawyers and American liberals', raIlying around their new leader, President Harry Truman, lobbied
the support needed for the Nuremberg trials to take place: ibid, at 5.
29
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international legislature? Is a less recognizable, non-formaI law-making function
possible? These and many more questions had no easy answers, and continue to haunt
international criminallaw.

Sheldon Glueck, in a wartime publication entitled War Criminals: Their Prosecution &

Punishment, argued in 1944 that Nazi war criminals should not be tried under national
law before national courts given the failure of this approach after WWI, but by an
international tribunal applying "the laws and customs of legitimate warfare and of the

criminal law co mm on to the civilized world"?O This articulation is similar to general
public international law sources, codified in 1922 by the League of Nations in Article
38(3) of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice which refers to
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations".31 However, as discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3, the international criminal law tradition has adapted this concept,
making it much more flexible, to suit its purposes and circumstances. Indeed, Glueck' s
concept of 'common criminal laws' continues to be of lasting theoretical value to the
development of international criminal law.

Unfortunately, a critical analysis of the

Nuremberg Charter as weIl as the proceedings, decisions and judgments of the IMT and
Control Council Law No. 10 tribunals demonstrate that relying on common criminallaws
did not generally take place.

30

Glueck, supra note 3 at 35 [emphasis added].

Permanent Court of International Justice, Statute of the Court, Series D, No. 1, 13 December 1920
(Leyden: A.W. Sijthoffs Publishing Company, 1926), art. 38(3). Subsequently, see also International Court
of Justice, Statute of the International Court ofJustice in LC.J. Acts and Documents, No. 5: Charter, Statute
and Rules of Court (1978) and other Documents, art. 38(1)(c), online: ICJ <http://www.icjcij .orglicjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextlibasicstatute.htm> [1CJ Statute].

31
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National Influences in Formai Nuremberg Law

The IMT held that the Nuremberg Charter "is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal".32
As a result, it refused to seriously question the legality of various offences over which it
had jurisdiction. It is significant that this tradition of treating an enabling statute as
having a constitutional status has been replicated by subsequent international tribunal s,
such that "[e]ach international criminal tribunal interprets the law in accordance with the
instrument creating the tribunal itself.,,33 With respect to the substantive law embodied in
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, both inc1uded modes of liability such as conspiracy
"even before the concept was received, under different aspects in civilist legal systems.
At that time, it was due to American influence in the framing of the statutes of the IMT
and IMTFE".34 Indeed, during the preparatory work on the Nuremberg Charter, the
French delegation argued against inc1uding conspiracy as a mode of liability, calling it "a
barbarous concept unworthy of modem law", and the Soviet delegation "was outright
shocked at the concept of conspiracy". 35

While it has been only rarely acknowledged, the Soviets also played a major role in
shaping the Nuremberg Charter. Recent historical accounts suggest that Soviet positions
on the emerging international criminal law tradition are still with us today, inc1uding:
superior / command responsibility, hostage taking as a war crime, and the crime of
32

IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law of the Charter.

33

Kittiehaisaree, supra note Il at 44.

M. CherifBassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers
Ine., 2003) at 8, n. 27 [Bassiouni, 2003].

34

,r-..

35 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Appeals Transeript, 26 May 1997, pp. 15-17
cited in Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint and Separate Opinion of Judge
MeDonald and Judge Vohrah, Appeals Chamber, 7 Oetober 1997, para. 46 [Erdemovié, Judges MeDonald
and Vohrah].
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/

waging aggressive war36 (revived in Article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, but
still awaiting coming into force). FormaI Nuremberg law, therefore, varied in several
important ways from common criminallaws as advocated by Glueck, discussed above.

Partial judicialArticulation of Sources of Law

The Nuremberg Charter itself did not include a provision on applicable law that the IMT
was to apply in its proceedings. This approach was similarly adopted in the statutes of
subsequent international tribunals, with the Rome Statute of the ICC being the first to
articulate applicable sources of law. 37 As part of the IMT judgment, a partial definition of
the sources of international criminal law was enumerated. Notably, it was limited to
defining only one aspect of this emerging tradition's substantive law, namely
international humanitarian law. The IMT followed the post-WWI American position,
discussed above, that treaty and custom constitute the substantive law being applied.
While not adopting principles of humanity (i.e. the Martens Clause) as a source of law,
the IMT did cautiously recognize the need for progressive development in the law:
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of
states which gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general princip les of
justice applied by jurists and practiced by military courts. This law is not static, but by
continuai adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate reference the principles of
law already existing. 38

Law-Making Authortfy of International j udges: Procedural and Evidentiary Law
John Quigley, "Soviet Influences on International Criminal Law in the Nuremberg Era" (1996) 7 Crim. L.
F. 447 at 448-450; see also generally, George Ginsburgs, Moscow's Road to Nuremberg: The Soviet
Background to the Trial (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996).
36

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9, art. 21 [ICC Statute].
37

38

IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law of the Charter [emphasis added].
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With respect to rules of international criminal procedure, Article 13 of the Nuremberg
Charter simply stated: "The Tribunal shaH draw up rules for its procedure. These rules
shaH not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter. ,,39 Such rules were adopted,
but were quite Spartan by any standard. 40 Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter similarly
provided with respect to international criminal evidentiary law: "The Tribunal shaH not be
bound by technical rules of evidence. It shaH adopt and apply to the greatest possible
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shaH admit any evidence which it
deems to have probative value.,,41 The Tokyo Charter adopted language identical to this
provision, but also added: "[ ... ] AH purported admissions or statements of the accused are
admissible.,,42 In practice, the IMT and IMTFE have been criticized because "the judges
made the rules of procedure and evidence as they went along", which resulted in
"inconsistency of judicial rulings". 43

Based on the vast discretionary authority on admissibility issues, the IMT was criticized
for admitting hearsay and opinion evidence during its proceedings. 44 However, Richard

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 13
[Nuremberg Charter]; see also ibid, art. 24; see also Charter of the International Military Tribunalfor the
Far East, 19 January 1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.LA.S. No. 1589, art. 7, online: Avalon Project
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm> [Tokyo Charter]; see also ibid, art. 15; see Rules of
Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 25 April 1946, online: Avalon Project
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtferul.htm>. The IMT's Chief Prosecutors were together
responsible "to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval draft mIes of procedure,
contemplated by Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shaH have the power to accept, with or without
amendments, or to reject, the mIes so recommended": Nuremberg Charter, ibid, art. 14(e).
39

International Military Tribunal, Rules of Procedure, 29 October 1945, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol.
1, Rules of Procedure, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtlproc/imtrules.htm>
[IMT Rules].

40

41

Nuremberg Charter, supra note 39, art. 19.

42

Tokyo Charter, supra note 39, art. 13(a).

43

May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv.

44

de Than & Shorts, supra note 4 at 276.
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May and Marieke Wierda have argued in favour of this approach to admissibility at
Nuremberg based on the mixed nature of the trial, blending aspects of the common law
and civilian traditions:
Although the trials were adversarial and the parties alone were responsible for caHing the
evidence, the judges were sitting without a jury, and the common law rules designed to
prevent jurors from hearing prejudicial evidence were discarded in favour of a liberal
approach akin to that of civillaw systems. 45

Another example of the blending of traditions occurred among the Nuremberg
Prosecutors, hailing from both common and civilian traditions, over the requirements of
the charging documents. 46

As a result of these provisions, the Nuremberg approach of vesting institutional authority
in international judges to make procedural and evidentiary law was followed in
subsequent international tribunals,47 which similarly lacked an external legislative body
that could enact and amend such roles. The variation being that the modem ad hoc
tribunals enacted detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence to apply beforehand, which

45

May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 729.

46 Johnathan A. Bush, "Lex Americana: Constitutional Due Process and the Nuremberg Defendants" (2001)
45 St. Louis L. J. 515 at 524.

See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since

47

1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, V.N. Doc. S/827 (1993), art. 15 [ICTY
Statute]: "The judges of the International Tribunal shaH adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the
conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appea1s, the admission of evidence, the
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters." Statute of the International Criminal

Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Other Such Violations
Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, S.c. Res. 955, V.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453 mtg.,
Annex, V.N. doc S/955 (1994), art. 14 [ICTR Statute]: "The Judges of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda shan adopt, for the purpose ofproceedings before the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the
admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia with such changes as they deem necessary."
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have been frequently reviewed and amended. 48 It has been observed that this approach
"gave the judges of the[se ... ] tribunals a quasi-Iegislative power, which was, for all
practical purposes, unmatched in the world's major legal systems where distinctions
between legislative and judicial powers are carefully observed.,,49 As will be discussed,
however, judges of the ICC have very limited formaI law-making authority with respect
to rules of procedure and evidence, with primary legislative authority being vested in the
Assembly of States Parties. 50

Answering Unanswered Questions
A natural consequence of the Nuremberg Charter' s failure to define applicable sources of
law, the allowance for judge-made procedural and evidentiary law, and the nascent state
of international criminal law at the time, was that questions would inevitably arise for
which there were no clear answers. The result was that rules and concepts were borrowed
and imported from national legal traditions. However, "[e]xperiences in national legal
systems are not easily transferable to international legal institutions. More particularly,
they cannot easily be merged with other national experiences".51

It may be for these reasons that the IMT hid the normative basis of sorne of its important

decisions, such that the independent sources of the international criminal law tradition
See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Commirted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Ru/es of
Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), as amended [ICTY Rules]; International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, Ru/es of Procedure and Evidence, V.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (1995), as amended [ICTR
Ru1es].

48

49

May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv [emphasis added].

50

Ibid. at 20.

Sl

Ibid. at xv.
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were concealed. This may be se en in a pre-trial decision on trials in absentia of mentally
incapacitated accused, and in the IMT' s final judgment regarding the definition of
conspiracy.

Defence Counsel for the Defendant Krupp von Bohlen argued before the IMT that the
accused, who was suffering from serious mental illness, should not be tried in absentia. 52
Defence Counsel relied on the civilian legal tradition in support of this argument:
[ ... ] the procedure in absentia against Krupp, would be contrary to justice, not only
according to the provisions of the Charter but also according to the generally recognized
princip les of the law of procedure of civilized states.
So far as 1 am informed, no law of procedure of a continental state permits a court
procedure against somebody who is absent, mentally deranged, and completely incapable
of arguing his case. According to the German Law of Procedure, the trial must be
postponed in such a case (Paragraph 205 of the German Code of Criminal Law). If
prohibiting the trial of a defendant, who is incapable of being trie d, is a generally
recognized princip le of procedure (principe général de droit reconnu par des nations
civilisées) in the sense ofParagraph 38 (c) of the Statute of the International Court in The
Hague, then a tribunal upon which the attention of the whole world is, and the attention of
future generations will be directed, cannot ignore this prohibition. 53

In response, Mf. Justice Robert Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States conceded
that "a man in the physical and mental condition of Krupp could not be tried" under
American law or under the law of "most of the jurisdictions".54 Sir Hartley Shawcross,
Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom, also admitted that under English criminal law,
such a trial could not take place. 55 Nevertheless, Justice Jackson argued that the IMT
should try the accused and ignore common criminallaws of the world:
52 United States of America et al. v. Hermann Wilhelm Goring et al., Trials of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 2, Preliminary Hearing, 14
November 1945 at 1, online: Avalon Project <http://www.mazal.orgiarchive/imtl02/lmt02-TOOl.htm>
[IMT Preliminary Hearing).
53

Ibid. at 3 [emphasis added).

54

Ibid. at 9.

55

Ibid. at 12.
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Of course, trial in absentia has great disadvantages. It would not comply with the
constitution al standard for citizens of the United States in prosecutions conducted in our
country. It presents grave difficulties to counsel under the circumstances of this case. Yet,
in framing the Charter, we had to take into account that all manner of avoidances of trial
would be in the interests of the defendants, and therefore, the Charter authorized trial in
absentia when in the interests of justice, leaving this broad generality as the only guide to
the Court's discretion. 56

Without explicitly stating the basis for its decision, the IMT decided in a brief one-page
order to grant the postponement of the proceedings against the Defendant Krupp effectively refusing to try him. 57 Given the confidential nature of the IMT' s judicial
deliberations, it is equally possible that the trial of this accused was prevented on account
of the IMT' s independent assessment of the 'interests of justice', or its decision to follow
the approach directed by common criminal laws of the world.

The fact that it is

impossible to know the basis of the decision, or how it was made, prevented it from
transmitting information about the inner workings of the international criminal law
tradition.

Similarly, in considering the elements of conspiracy, which was not defined in the
Nuremberg Charter, the IMT judgment outlined a definition ofthis mode ofresponsibility
without invoking any authorities whatsoever:
Conspiracy is not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy
must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed from the
time of decision and of action. The planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the
declarations of a party programme, such as are found in the twenty five points of the Nazi
Party, announced in 1920, or the political affIrmations expressed in 'Mein Kampf in later
years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and

56

Ibid at 5 [emphasis added].

57 United States of America et al. v. Gustav Krupp von Bah/en et al., Order of the Tribunal Granting
Postponement of Proceedings Against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, 15 November 1945, online: Avalon
Project <http://www.mazal.org/archive/imt/01lIMT01-T143.htm> [IMT, Krupp Decision]. It should be
noted that another accused, Martin Bormann, Head of the Nazi Party Chancellery was tried in absentia and
sentenced to death: Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 18.
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determine the participants in that concrete plan. It is not necessary to decide whether a
58
single master conspiracy between the defendants has been established by the evidence.

Again, these opaque reasons have hampered the development of international criminal
law because they offer no guidance or methodology as to how an international tribunal
may go about identifying norms and elaborating rules which are not already explicitly set
out in formaI sources oflaw.

Affects on other Traditions
The birth of international criminal law at Nuremberg also had external effects in, and
across, other legal traditions. In particular, the substantive and pro ce duraI innovations of
the Nuremberg process spurred developments in national human rights law,59 and
contributed to the advent of regional human rights law and bodies such as the European
Court of Human Rights. 60 At the same time, there was a flurry of activity in international
humanitarian law, leading to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Nuremberg promised to give
this previously meager body of law sorne real teeth, and this was recognized by the
inclusion of the 'grave breaches' provisions in international humanitarian law treaties,
which have been interpreted to codify individual criminal responsibility.61

58

IMT Judgement, supra note 1 at Judgement: The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy.

59 Ellen Ash Peters, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of
Nuremberg: The Capacity of Judicial Institutions to Play an Affirmative Role in the International Protection
of Human Rights: Implications for and from Domestic Law" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 219 at 222-3.
60 Mark W. Janis, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of
Nuremberg - The Utility ofInternational Criminal Courts" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 161 at 168.
61 See Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 50 [GC 1]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 51 [GC
II]; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, Geneva, 12 August 1949, art. 130 [GC
III]; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar, Geneva, 12 August
1949, art. 147 [GC IV], aIl online: ICRC <http://www.icrc.org>.
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Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Control Council Law No. 10
The possibility of an international criminal law tradition emerging from the post-WWII
era would have been substantially diminished were it not for the creation of military
tribunals under Control Council Law No.

la which tried lesser Nazi war criminals on the

basis of the precedent of the IMT judgment, giving it immediate relevance and
refinement.

Confusion is apparent in the case law of these military tribunals as to

whether they were international tribunals applying internationallaw or not. In one case, a
Control Council Law No.

la

tribunal explicitly identified itself as an international

tribunal which administered internationallaw - a position confirmed by the D.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia which held that the tribunal' s "powers and
jurisdiction arose out of the joint sovereignty of the Four victorious powers".62 However,
in another case, a Control Council Law No. 10 tribunal took the view that "this is an
American court of Justice, applying the ancient and fundamental concepts of AngloSaxon jurisprudence".63 For its part, Control Council Law No.

la

explicitly sought to

establish a degree of uniformity in the norms applied in prosecuting war criminals in
Germany after WWII, suggesting that these tribunals were not to simply apply the
respective nationallaws of the victorious powers in their zones of occupation:
In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of30 October 1943 and the
London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in
order to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution ofwar criminals

Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d. 983, 984-986; cert. den. 338 U.S. 879 (1949) and Trial of Frederick Flick and
Five Others ('Flick' case), Trials ofWar Criminals, vol. VI, p. 1188 cited in Erdemovié, Judges McDonald
and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 53.

62

Trial of Erhard Milch ('Milch' case), Trials ofWar Criminals, vol. II, p. 778 cited in Erdemovié, Judges
McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 53.

63
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and other similar ofJenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military
4
Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows: [ ...

t

However, the degree to which uniformity of the legal basis for prosecutions under Control
Council Law No. 10 took place in practice in the Allied Zones varied widely. The best
examples of "systematic and mutually harmonious" implementation of the law reportedly
took place in the V.S. and French zones, while the British zone relied on a Royal
Warrant65 for their trials, and the Soviets failed to conduct trials pursuant to the Control
Council Law No. 10 at aIl. 66

Past International Criminal Law Decisions as Precedent
The common law concept of precedent was quickly adopted by the Control Council Law
No. 10 military tribunals as they frequently relied on the IMT judgment. For example,
the Military Tribunal in Farben, acting under Control Council Law No. 10, held that the
IMT judgment was "basic and persuasive precedent".67 This carefully chosen language
of 'persuasive precedent' is significant in that these tribunals did not consider themselves
to be strictly bound through stare decisis to the IMT judgment.

&lationship with other Legal Traditions in Words and Action
Law No. 10 of the Control Councilfor Germany, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany,
preamble, online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avaloniimt/imtlO.htm> [Control Council
Law No. 10; emphasis added].

64

Royal Warrant- Regulationfor the Trial ofWar Criminals (U.K.), 0160/2498, A.O. 81/1945, 18 June
1945,online: Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonlimt/imtroyal.htm>.

65

66 Daryl A. Mundis, "Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons
from the Nuremberg Process" (2005) 28 Fordham Int'l L. J. 591 at 599-560.

United States ofAmerica v. Carl Krauch et al. (Farben Case), Case No. 6, Military Tribunal VI in Trials
ofWar Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. VIII
(United States: Government Printing Office, 1953) at 1098, online: Avalon Project
<http://www.mazal.orglarchive/nmt/04/NMT04-TOOO 1.htrn> [Farben].

67
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A critical reading of the Control Council Law No. 10 proceedings reveals a more
transparent approach than the IMT decisions on so-called unanswered questions. These
subsequent military tribunals also articulated a more coherent relationship between
existing legal traditions (principally the common law / Anglo-American, and civilian /
Continental systems) and the emerging international criminallaw tradition.

A significant holding in the Hostages Case provided that "if a principle is found to have
been accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their
municipal law, its declaration as a rule of international law would seem to be fully
justified.,,68 National rules of criminallaw become applicable at the internationallevel on
this view only when there is sufficient accord among them. As discussed later, once
r-..

transposed, these rules may take on an independent existence at the international level.
Subsequently, they may flow back into nationallegal traditions and influence them, with
the cycle repeating itself over time. In Chapter 3, the ICC's complementarity regime will
be considered in light of this observation.

However, despite this theoretical approach as described in the Hostages Case, an analysis
of the Control Council Law No. 10 proceedings demonstrates that these judges only
narrowly considered national laws, or simply applied their own national laws. 69

In

Farben, American criminal law was heavily relied upon by the Military Tribunal

lU

resolving issues unaddressed by its formallaw, despite Defence Counsel's "controversy
68 As interpreted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22,
Appeals Chamber, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, 7 October 1997, para. 25
[Erdemovié, Judge Stephen; emphasis added].
69

Kirtichaisaree, supra note Il at 44.
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whether the rules governing this case should be derived from the German penal law or
from a judicial system based either on the continental law of Europe or on the all
embracing internationallaw". 70 The Military Tribunal cited the IMT judgment on the law
regarding conspiracy, and developed it further by invoking case law of the United States
Supreme Court. 7l It also expressly invoked fundamental principles of 'Anglo-American
criminallaw' regarding the rights of the accused:
In weighing the evidence and in determining the ultimate facts of guilt or innocence with
respect to each defendant, we have sought to apply these fundamental principles ofAngloAmerican criminallaw:
1. There can be no conviction without proof of personal guilt.
2. Guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

3. Each defendant is presumed to be innocent, and that presumption abides with him
throughout the trial.
4. The burden ofproofis, at aIl times, upon the prosecution.
5. Iffrom credible evidence two reasonable inferences may be drawn, one of guilt and the
other of innocence, the latter must prevail. 72

Whether these principles were in fact part of a broader transnational common criminal
law was not considered by the Military Tribunal - they were only grounded in the
common law tradition.

However, in the Einsatzgruppen Case, in confirming that individuals may be responsible
for certain violations of international law, the Military Tribunal cited the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, as well as the Recht der Landkriegsfuehrung (German Military

70

Farben, supra note 67 at 954.

71

See ibid at 1127.

72

Ibid at 1108.
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Manual) and a collection on German Military Law. 73 This willingness to incorporate
nationallegal traditions did not extend to the communist legal order in this case. Defence
Counsel had argued that Soviet criminallaw afforded a defence of 'self-defence on behalf
of a third party', and sought to invoke the doctrine. The Military Tribunal responded in a
cynical and revealing passage of its decision, rejecting the possibility:
In developing this theme of defense for Germany, Dr. Aschenauer insisted that this
Tribunal apply his interpretation of Soviet law. One cannot avoid noting the paradox of
the defendant's invoking the law of a country whose jurisprudence, ideologies,
government and social system were aU declared antagonistic to Germany, and which very
laws, ideologies, govemment, and social system the defendants, with the rest of the
German Armed Forces, had set out to destroy. However, it is the prerogative of defense
counsel to advance any argument which he deems appropriate in behalf of his client and
the fact that Dr. Aschenauer considers Soviet law more modem than German law cannot
fail to be interesting. 74

The Military Tribunal ultimately rejected this Soviet criminallaw defence, indicating that
it did not correspond "with any acceptable tenets of internationallaw". 75 The generalized
nature of the rejection seems suspect, given that other Military Tribunals had no difficulty
applying or questioning nationallaw from a single jurisdiction, principally the U.S., with
which they were more familiar and from which they hailed.

From these cases, it appears that theoretical insistence on deriving general principles of
law from national legal systems was not followed up in practice with any real
comparative analysis by the post-WWII tribunals. This internaI contradiction in the early
practice of the international criminal law has persisted, albeit to a lesser extent, at the
modem ad hoc tribunals, as discussed in the next chapter.
United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf et al. (Einsatzgruppen Case), Case No. 9, Military Tribunal
II-A in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.
10, Vol. IV at 460-1, online: Avalon Project <http://www.mazal.org/archive/nmt/04/NMT04-T0460.htm>
[Einsatzgruppen] .
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Ibid. at 462-3.
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Ibid. at 464.
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Implications of BarlY Institutions of International Criminal Law

International criminal law emerged in an institutional 'vacuum' .76 While a Permanent
International Court of Justice had been in existence for over two decades under the
auspices of the League of Nations, it was limited to disputes between States and
concerned itself with questions of public internationallaw. Entirely new institutions had
to be created to try individuals for international crimes before international judges.

These early institutions of international criminal law came into existence alongside the
prosecution of war criminals before national courts after WWII. 77 A defining feature of
the international criminallaw tradition is, therefore, its competitive (or 'complementary')
relationship with national jurisdictions and their distinct legal systems. Without a space
in which to develop and proliferate after WWII until the end of the Cold War, an
international criminallaw tradition could not truly emerge. Like any tradition, it required
room in which to develop and grow. The modem ad hoc tribunals, discussed in Chapter
2, were able to make so much headway in developing the tradition largely owing to their
powerful jurisdictional primacy and comparatively vast infrastructure. 78

76

May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiv.

77 See London Agreement of August 8th 1945, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1, arts. 4, 6, online:
Avalon Project <http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlimtlproc/imtchart.htm> [emphasis added].
78 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 at paras. 56, 58 (requesting Germany defer
to the ICTY) [Tadié, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction]; ln the Matter of a Proposai for a Formai Request
for DeferraI ta the Competence of the Tribunal Addressed ta the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
Respect of Radovan Karadiié, Ratko Mladié and Miéo Stanisié, Case No. IT-95-5-D, Trial Chamber,
Decision on the Bosnian Serb Leadership DeferraI ProposaI, 16 May 1995 at paras. 2, 5, 26 (requesting
Bosnia and Herzegovina defer to the ICTY); see also Madeline Harris, "The Trials of Concurrent
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda" in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, Vol. III, 2nd
ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1999) at 576-7 (requesting Rwanda and Belgium defer to the
ICTR) [Bassiouni, 1999].
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Another defining institutional aspect ofthe early institutions of international criminallaw,
as weU as the modem ad hoc tribunals, is their symbiotic relationship with political
considerations. These institutions, much like their successors, were created in response to
atrocious events in war, such that "these institutions have been shaped by politicalleaders
and diplomats rather than by jurists with experience in international and comparative
criminal law and procedure.'.79 Antonio Cassese has acknowledged that international
criminallaw and international politics "are forever intertwined [ ... ] We are aware that so
long as international political demands are at odds with interests of justice, justice might
have to capitulate. But we are making huge effort to avoid such a capitulation."so While
the ICC as a permanent institution is relatively more insulated from specific political
motivations, the process of drafting the Rome Statute was a mixed exercise of diplomats
with comparative and international lawyers, and representatives of civil society (i.e. nonState actors).

Loosely interlocking institutions was another important early feature of international
criminal law institutions.

The IMT judgment and infrastructure was largely made

available for the subsequent Control Council Law No. 10 cases, significantly facilitating
their achievements. S1

As discussed, Control Council Law No. 10's caU for uniform

application of law meant that at least sorne degree of consistency resulted. However,

79

May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at xiii.

80 Antonio Cassese, "Symposium: Law, War and Human Rights: International Courts and the Legacy of
Nuremberg: Remarks Given at the Old State House" (1997) 12 Conn. J. Int'l L. 201 at 207-8.

/"- ..

81 Mundis, supra note 66 at 613. The IMT judgement was also a very important precedent for the IMTFE:
Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 19.
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since there was no appellate procedure, it was not entirely possible to ensure coherent
application of law across the various Military Tribunals deciding cases under the
authority of Control Council Law No. 10, despite aspirations to do so. The lifespan of
these post-WWII tribunals was also quite limited, such that aIl trials were complete within
several years, and decision-makers were restricted to the nationalities of the Allied
judges. These institutional realities combined with the virtual absence of war crimes
prosecutions until the creation of the ICTY after the end of the Cold War82 meant that
international criminallaw was a relatively primitive and impoverished body of law at this
stage.

Conclusion
Without the advent of the modern ad hoc tribunals, it would have been impossible to calI
the post-WWII tribunals the birthplace of an international criminal law tradition - they
would have simply been a historical moment, and nothing more. Continuity was only
achieved as the modern ad hoc tribunals looked back and drew, sometimes heavily, upon
the post-WWII tribunals to claim their legitimacy, gained over time, and in so doing also
inherited many of the same underlying assumptions, challenges and controversies of these
legacy tribunals.

A critical analysis of the origins of the emerging international criminal law tradition has
provided important insights into its fundamental core. First and foremost, it is a hybrid
tradition which seeks legitimacy and answers to difficult questions by drawing on other
82 RoelofHavemanet al., eds., Supranational Criminal Law: A System Sui Generis (Antwerp: Intersentia,
2003) at 1.
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established legal traditions.

In practice, it has struggled to do so effectively for

institutional reasons as weIl as obvious difficulties in attempting to reconcile vastly
different national legal systems. Secondly, its aims appear to be frequently at odds:
enhancing humanitarian protection, on one hand, and protecting the rights of the accused
on the other. Third, its institutional structure has traditionally vested significant lawmaking power in the hands of international judges. The nagging question as to whether
the unresolved tensions in the international criminal law tradition are systematic and
intrinsic only grows as the experience of the modem ad hoc tribunals is critically
evaluated.
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CHAPTER

2

Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition: ICTY IR

The development of international criminallaw through over a decade of jurisprudence at
the ICTY and ICTR has confirmed many of the features of this emergent tradition as
discussed in Chapter 1, and made it possible to focus sharply on fundamental questions
about its sources and institutions. The hybrid nature of international criminal law makes
it impossible to confine its sources to simple reiterations of the sources of public
international law, despite repeated attempts to do so. The intractable tensions already
identified in the origins of this tradition, between extending humanitarian protection and
ensuring fairness to the accused, have only intensified and continue to be at the crux of
hard cases which have come before the modem ad hoc tribunals. Renewed interest in the
Martens Clause, discussed in Chapter 1, and a proliferation in codification of international
humanitarian law in 1949 and 1977 has added new normative force to extending
humanitarian protection. On the other hand, international human rights law has similarly
experienced massive growth and codification since the post-WWII tribunals, meaning
that an accused in any criminal proceeding is entitled to a broader range of specifie rights,
and more generally, to guarantees of a fair trial.

In several noteworthy instances, the modem ad hoc tribunals have explicitly resolved
lacunae in international criminal law based on favouring extending humanitarian
protection over ensuring fairness to the accused, and vice versa. In other cases, national
laws, as part of grander common law and civilian legal traditions, have served a 'gap
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filling' function. It is argued that these transnational common laws have not simply been
aggregated to establish rules of customary international law or general principles of law,
but have been drawn upon at the discretion of these international judges as persuasive,
non-binding authority.

This controversial view is particularly significant given that

Article 21 of the Rome Statute explicitly contemplates that "national laws will provide a
'fall-back' resource similar to that in the current [ad hoc] tribunals".83

Struggling to Refine Sources of Law and Interpretive Doctrines
The Statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals were handed down by the D.N. Security
Council, offering a definitive constitutional document to be applied, serving the same
function as the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters. Similar to the post-WWII tribunals,
these modern judges were empowered to enact Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but this
time amended them substantially over time based on experience gained during successive
proceedings, and based on "general principles underlying the major legal systems of the
world".84

While the Statutes of the modern ad hoc tribunals are more detailed than the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Charters, they similarly do not include an explicit definition of applicable
law. 85

Sorne observers consider that this has been the practice owing to 'political

considerations', namely that it would be difficult to obtain prompt agreement among

83

May & Wierda, 2002, supra note 2 at 102.

84

May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 735.

85 They did, however, authorize the application of various international treaties, including grave breaches of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and, additionally in the case of the ICTR, serious violations of Additional
Protocol II of 1977: see ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art. 2; ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 4.
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States on what law(s) should be applicable. 86 Cherif Bassiouni has charged that matters
that were unaddressed in the legacy and modem ad hoc tribunal statutes "have been dealt
with on an ad hoc and sometimes an improvised manner".87 Unlike the IMT and IMTFE
which only consisted of one mega-trial each, however, the modem ad hoc tribunals were
created to prosecute dozens of separate cases. When faced with questions which were not
resolved in their Statutes or Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the judges of these modem
ad hoc tribunals felt it necessary to articulate a de facto definition of applicable law to
lend legitimacy to their adjudication and provide a degree of theoretical coherence to the
emerging international criminal law tradition. In so doing, these judges went beyond the
rudimentary judicial definition of applicable law offered in the IMT judgment, discussed
in Chapter 1, which referred only to sources of international humanitarian law - one part
of the substantive law of international criminallaw.

Public internationallaw, international humanitarian law, international human rights law,
and national criminal laws are streams which feed international criminallaw. Given that
there was no international criminal code in the mid-1990s when the ad hoc tribunals were
created, nationallegal traditions varied in their identification of sources of criminallaws,
and international humanitarian law offered no guidance on how to conduct a criminal
trial, resort to general public international law was thought to be a logical place to find
broadly defined sources of international criminallaw. Specifically, judges of the modem
ad hoc tribunals adopted Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice

86

Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at 267.

87

Ibid., at 263.
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(lCl Statute)88 as their own to provide a normative super-structure to define applicable
sources of international criminallaw. 89 Commentators have explicitly indicated the need,
however, for these sources of law to be "subject to the principles of legality which derive
from general principles of law".9o Likewise, in interpreting their Statutes, the modern ad
hoc tribunals have imported Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 91 to define the interpretive canons of international criminallaw,92 despite the fact

that the Statutes of these tribunals were created under V.N. Security Council resolutions
and are not, strictly speaking, international treaties.

88

Reproduced in Appendix: ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(1).

89 See, e.g., for ICTY: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-1711-A, Appeals Chamber,
Declaration of Judge Patrick Robinson, 21 July 2000, p. 94 at n. 10 [Furundiija, Judge Robinson];
Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 40; Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case
No. IT-95-1411-A, Appeals Chamber, Declaration of Judge David Hunt, 24 March 2000, n. 1 [Aleksovski,
Judge Hunt]; see also, e.g., for ICTR: Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Appeals
Chamber, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, 31 May 2000, n. 20; Prosecutor v. Jean Bosco
Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision (Prosecutor's Request for Review
ofReconsideration), 31 March 2000, para. 20.
90

Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at 4.

91 Reproduced in Appendix: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 V.N.T.S. 331,
arts. 31-32.

See, e.g., for ICTY: Prosecutor v. Enver Hadtïhasanovié et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Trial Chamber,
Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction, 12 November 2002, para. 63 ("the Trial Chamber is bound to
interpret the Statute in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties");
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié et al., Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para.
300 [Tadié, Appeals Judgement]; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simié et al., Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber,
Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, 18 October 2000, para. 47;
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevié, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, Reasons for Decision on
Assignment of Defence Counsel, 22 September 2004, para. 31 ("From the earliest days of the work of the
International Tribunal, it was decided that the Statute is to be interpreted as a treaty."); see also, e.g., for
ICTR: Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora and 28 Others, Case No. ICTR-98-37-A, Appeals Chamber,
Decision on the Admissibility of the Prosecutor's Appeal From the Decision of a Confirming Judge
Dismissing an Indictment Against Théoneste Bagosora and 28 Others, 8 June 1998, para. 28 ("The Appeals
Chamber agrees with the Prosecutor on the applicability, mutatis mutandis, of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties to the Statute.") [Bagosora, Appeals Decision]; Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case
No. ICTR-96-15-A, Joint Separate and Concurring Opinion of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael NietoNavia,3 June 1999, para. Il ("[ ... ] the rules of the Vienna Convention, and Article 31 in particular, reflect
customary rules of interpretation which originate from principles found in systems of municipallaw [ ... ]").
92
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The implications of the modem ad hoc tribunals incorporating these public international
law concepts into international criminal law have been largely ignored. Without a doubt,
however, the case law of these tribunals demonstrates difficulties in importing these
general public international law doctrines, designed to deal with legal disputes between
States "based on a consensual relationship between co-equal sovereigns",93 into
international criminallaw, which is designed to prosecute individuals. It also presents, in
concrete terms, analogous problems to those which will realistically arise under Article
21 of the Rome Statute. Even where sources of law are provided for, there will be
lacunae which must be identified and understood, preferably before they appear in
practice.

Sources ofLaw

With respect to sources of law, most of the difficulties anse with respect to Article
38(l)(c) of the ICJ Statute which refers to "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations".94 In their Joint and Separate Opinion in Erdemovié, Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah of the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated that "one purpose of this article
is to avoid a situation of non-liquet, that is, where an international tribunal is stranded by
an absence of applicable legal rules".95 In actually deriving these general principles, the
approach adopted by these judges was described by them as follows:
it is generally accepted that the distillation of a 'general principle of law recognised by
civilised nations' does not require the comprehensive survey of all legal systems of the
world as this would involve a practical impossibility and has never been the practice of
the International Court of Justice or other international tribunals which have had recourse
to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute [ ... ] In light ofthese considerations, our approach
93

Bassiouni, 2003, supra note 34 at II.

94

ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(l)(c).

95

Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 57.

37

Development of the International Criminal Law Tradition
will necessarily not involve a direct comparison of the specifie rules of each of the
world's le gal systems, but will instead involve a survey of those jurisdictions whose
jurisprudence is, as a practical matter, accessible to us in an effort to discem a general
trend, policy or princip le underlying the concrete rules of thatjurisdiction which comports
with the object and purpose of the establishment of the International Tribunal. 96

There are, however, several problems with the approach described by Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah, despite its obvious pragmatic justification. First, there is no answer
provided for how extensive a survey of national legal systems is required. In the sarne
case, Judge Stephen held that "no universal acceptance of a particular principle by every
nation within the main systems of law is necessary before lacunae can be filled; it is
enough that the prevailing number of nations within each of the main Jamilies of laws
recognize such a principle.,,97 By 'farnilies of laws', it is highly probable that Judge
Stephen is referring to legal traditions.

The legal traditions that the modem ad hoc

tribunals have drawn upon and validated in practice are considered later in this Chapter,
but it may be noted here that they are limited to Western legal traditions (i.e. common and
civillaw) in all but the rare st cases.

Secondly, jurisdictions which are accessible 'as a practical matter' clearly imports
institutional considerations into the equation which have undoubtedly affected the
development of international criminal law.
phenomenon, however.

This tradition is not alone in this

Historically, law travels only where it is known and in a

language that is understood by its adherents. 98 Recalling the earlier discussion of the
relationship between the staffing of the IMT on the national laws that it considered from
96

Ibid., para. 57.

97

Erdemovié, Judge Stephen, supra note 68, para. 25 [emphasis added].

98 H. Patrick Glenn, On Common Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 62 [Glenn, On Common
Laws].
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Chapter 1, it appears that Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah have accepted this practice
as legitimate at the modem ad hoc tribunal s, which are required to staff their positions
based on more diverse geographic representation.

Third, there may be a degree of incommensurability between the legal families or
traditions that the modem ad hoc tribunals have turned their mind towards. There are
significant theoretical and practical limitations in resorting to national laws, which are
situated in vastly different legal systems, to resolve isolated and narrow questions for
international criminallaw. In Simié, Judge Hunt recognized this problem in the context
of international rules of evidence:
It is not easy to disco ver general principles of law in relation to this issue which are

recognised by the domestic laws of (aIl) civilised nations. This is because most civillaw
systems have detailed statutory provisions in relation to evidence which is the subject of
daims of confidentiality, whereas most common law systems leave it to the courts to
determine where the balance lies between competing public interests. It is therefore
necessary, in my view, to commence from first principles. 99

However, in Delalié, the ICTY Trial Chamber took a different approach, approving of a
highly discretionary power of the judges to fill gaps in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence by making ec1ectic use ofnationallaws oftheir choice:
Whilst not being bound by national mIes of evidence, it seems to the Trial Chamber that
the Chambers can, where appropriate, be guided by such national mIes. Hence, the
Chambers may in their discretion apply rules of evidence which will best favour the
determination of the matter before them. In any case, such laws must be consistent with
the spirit of the Statute and general princip les of law. 100

This approach is more generally codified in Rule 89(B) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence ofboth of the modem ad hoc tribunals, enacted by the judges of the se tribunals:

99 Prosecutor v. Bladoje Simié et al., Ex Parte and Confidential Opinion of Judge David Hunt on
Prosecutor's Motion for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony ofa Witness, 27 July 1999, para. 24 (WL).
100 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalié et al., Case No. IT-96-21, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion to Allow
Witness K, L, and M to Give Their Testimony by Means ofVideo-Link Conference, 28 May 1997, para. 7.
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In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Charnber shaH apply rules of
evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter be[ore it and are
consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law. 1 1

These statements differ sharply from a faithful application of Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute, thus reinforcing the origins of international criminallaw being driven by judicial
discretion, given its long-standing absence of an external institutional framework to enact,
amend and repeal the law that is applied. 102 To develop this point further, it is helpful to
introduce a legal theory which offers an alternative explanatory perspective on how law is
being selected and applied by the modem ad hoc tribunals in difficult cases where there
are lacunae in formaI sources.

Patrick Glenn's theory of transnational common laws offers sorne promising insights
when applied to the international criminal law tradition. Transnational common laws
have "no obligatory or mandatory content", yield to particular laws (meaning that they
largely fulfill a 'gap filling' function), and depend on "persuasion and collaboration,
amongst jurists, amongst judges.,,103 While Glenn's the ory has been "hampered by the
idea that the source of an law is the nation-state",104 it has the potential for greater
purchase in this emergent international tradition, which is not restrained by the
exclusivity of the domestic law of any given State. The above statements interpreting the
applicable law at the modem ad hoc tribunals cornes very close to applying these

lOI

ICTY Rules, supra note 48, r. 89(B); ICTR Rules, supra note 48, r. 89(B).

102 In this regard, the creation of the Assernbly of States Parties for the ICC is a major institutional
developrnent which will be considered in detail in Chapter 3.
103

Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 62,45.

104 H. Patrick Glenn, "Transnational Cornrnon Laws" at 1 (undated) [Glenn; "Transnational Cornrnon
Laws"; on file with author].
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transnational common laws, which operate in the background and appear when hard cases
present themselves. 105

Further evidence of this having taken place in practice is

considered later in this Chapter - also demonstrating that 'transnational judicial
dialogue,106 is part of the international criminal law tradition in order to transmit
information. lndeed, the concept of 'general principles of law' has been seen in other
contexts to provide a 'liaison' between nationallaws. 107 Similarly, Michèle Buteau and
Gabriël Oosthuizen have sought to demonstrate that substantive and procedurallacunae in
the Statutes of the modem ad hoc tribunals are filled by resorting to the inherent, implied,
or incidental powers of the judges to resolve such matters. 108

At this stage of

development of the international criminallaw tradition, the final component of Glenn's
transnational common laws theory - "the recognition of different groups of people to
whom different laws could be applied,,109 - has yet to fully materialize, but has the
potential to do so at the ICC based on Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, discussed
further in Chapter 3. 11 0

This hypothesis that judges at the modem ad hoc tribunals fill lacunae in international
criminal law in a manner consistent Glenn's transnational common laws theory, as
105

Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 20.

106

Glenn, "Transnational Cornrnon Laws", supra note 104 at 12, 17.

107

Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 49, n. 19.

108 Michèle Buteau & Gabriël Oosthuizen, "When the Statute and the Rules are Silent: The Inherent Powers
of the Tribunal" in Richard Mayet al., eds., Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence (The Hague: Kluwer
Law International, 2001) 65 at 80
109 Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at 63. Glenn refers to the theory as relational cornrnon laws as
weIl.
110 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this elernent has been brought in through the operation of Article
21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute which directs the ICC to apply, "[ ... ] as appropriate, the national laws of
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime [ ... ]": ICC Statute, supra note 37, art.
21(1)(c).
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opposed to adherence to Article 38(1) of the lCJ Statute, is likely to be controversial. lll
The aim at this stage, however, is not to provide a normative theory but a descriptive one.
Glenn's theory is very different from engaging in a detailed comparative analysis of state
practice and evidence of opinio juris for the purpose of declaring a rule of customary
international law or finding a general principle of law, within the meaning of Article
38(1 )(b),(c) of the lCJ Statute. This distinction was implicitly recognized in Furundiija
by Judge Robinson who began by noting that "[i]t is perfectly proper, therefore, to
examine national decisions on a particular question in order to ascertain the existence of
international custom", 112 but then back-tracked to deny that any such use of nationallaws
was being made in the judgment:
Although the Judgement examines provisions in the European Convention on Human
Rights, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, decisions from sorne common
law countries - the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and the United States - and
observes the 'trend in civil law jurisdictions', it does not do so for the purpose of
ascertaining whether there is any relevant rule of customary internationallaw.
The finding which the Chamber makes based upon this examination, is that 'there is a
general rule that a Judge should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that
there should be nothing in the surrounding circumstances which objectively gives rise to
an appearance of bias.' 113

Interpretive Doctrines

111 One of the most ardent opponents of this view would be Judge Cassese who stated that "[w]henever
reference to national law is not commanded expressly, or imposed by necessary implication, resort to
national legislation is not warranted": Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22, Appeals
Chamber, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 7 October 1997, para. 3 [Erdemovié, Judge
Cassese]. Where national laws must be considered, Judge Cassese notes that "the normal attitude of
international courts is to try to assimilate or transform the national law notion so as to adjust it to the
exigencies and basic principles of internationallaw": ibid.
112

Furundiija, Judge Robinson, supra note 89, para. 281.

113

Ibid., paras. 285-6 [emphasis added].
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The serious implication of wholesale importation of general public international law
interpretive doctrines into the international criminal law tradition has aIso been largely
unexplored. While a comparative analysis of Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and national criminal law interpretive doctrines is beyond the scope

of the present analysis, it suffices to recognize that important variances exist, flowing
from the basic fact that international mIes of interpretation are of general application to
disputes between States and do not typically involve the liberty interest of individuals.
These international interpretive doctrines are intended to be exhaustive, authorizing
extensive use of supplementary materials where required. The consequences. of these
realizations for international criminal proceedings have already been apparent at the
ICTY.

Defence Counsel in Hadiihasanovié challenged the use of Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties before the ICTY Appeals Chamber. In that

case, it was argued that "the object and purpose of the [ICTY] Statute cannot be relied
upon to determine whether command responsibility in the context of internaI armed
conflicts was law in 1993".114 The unspoken assumption in this statement relates back to
the seemingly irreconcilable aims of extending humanitarian protection and ensuring full
respect for the rights of the accused. In that case, Defence Counsel implicitly argued that
the U.N. Security Council did not have the power to criminalize behavior that was not

,

illegal at the time, even if it would extend humanitarian protection, because it would
violate the principle of legality.

114 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadiihasanovié et al., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Appeals Chamber, Interloeutory
Appeal on Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdietion, 27 November 2002, paras. 94-6 (Defenee Motion).
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In a Partial Dissenting Opinion in this case, Judge Shabuddeen explicitly discussed the
relationship between the interpretive rules set out in the Vien na Convention on the Law of
Treaties and the maxim in dubio pro reo ('uncertainty in the law must be interpreted in

favour of the accused'). Due to the relative exhaustiveness of international interpretive
doctrines, the maxim which is a fundamental interpretive principle in many national
systems was essentially eviscerated - demonstrating the repercussions of relying on
public internationallaw interpretive canons to resolve international criminallaw issues:
Paragraph 120 of the interlocutory appeal pleads that '(u)ncertainty in the law must be
interpreted in favour of the accused'. As 1 understand the injunctions of the maxim in
dubio pro reo and of the associated princip le of strict construction in criminal
proceedings, those injunctions operate on the result produced by a particular method of
interpretation but do not necessarily control the selection of the method. The selection of
the method in this case is governed by the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is only if the application of the method of
interpretation prescribed by the Convention results in a doubt which cannot be resolved
by recourse to the provisions of the Convention itself - an unlikely proposition - that the
maxim applies so as to prefer the meaning which is more favourable to the accused. In my
view, that is not the position here: there is no residual doubt. 115

International Human Rights Law as a Dynamic Normative Force

The development of international human rights law after WWII, developed and codified
in large measure through international treaties, has played a significant and ongoing role
in generating norms that have infused the international criminal law tradition since the
advent of the modem ad hoc tribunals. The ICTY Trial Chamber went so far as to state
in Furundiija that "[t]he general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic
underpinning and indeed the very raison d'être of international humanitarian law and

115 Prosecutor v. Enver Hadiihasanovié and Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber,
Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shabuddeen: Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging
Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, 16 July 2003, para. 12.
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human rights law; indeed in modem times it has become of such paramount importance
as to permeate the whole body ofinternationallaw.,,1l6

Only after the creation of the United Nations were a litany of treaties adopted and
resolutions passed to expand the body of international human rights law. By the time of
the creation of the modem ad hoc tribunals, international standards for the fair and proper
conduct of criminal proceedings in national courts had already taken on a transnational
character, making it impossible for these international criminal tribunals to ignore these
standards. 117 These norms continue to develop over time, evolving independently of
international criminal proceedings, and doing so in international human rights bodies,
regional human rights courts and national courts. For example, the Statutes of the modem

ad hoc tribunals which were adopted by the U.N. Security Council include detailed
provisions guaranteeing the rights of the accused which are largely taken from Article 14
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 1l8

In this respect,

considering international human rights law as merely persuasive 'information' exchanged
with international criminal law appears to understate its normative force. The ability of
this body of human rights law to develop international criminal law, in particular
international criminal evidence and procedure, has already been postulated in very strong
terms. As will be seen later, it also raises its head in cases of ambiguity in substantive

116 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 10 December 1998,
para. 183.
117 Salvatore Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003) at 245-7.

118 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 52, D.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 D.N.T.S. 171, art. 14; see ICTY Statute, supra note 47, art.
21 and ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 20.
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international criminallaw, in particular questions of specifie application of international
humanitarian law.

With respect to criminal procedure and evidence, Richard May and Marieke Wierda have
argued that trial fairness, as understood in international human rights law, has been the
motivating factor at the modem ad hoc tribunals to reconcile differences in nationallegal
traditions. They also argue that regional human rights law, in particular as expounded by
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Ruman Rights, has proven to provide a
powerful normative source of international cri minai law princip/es of evidence and
procedure, such as the concept of equality of armsy9 Christoph Safferling takes the
argument one step further, arguing that the only way to bridge the gap between common
and civilian legal traditions at the international level is "to find a consensus in a truly
international criminal procedure that aIl states can accept. In order to achieve this, the
discussion must begin with what states have already accepted, that is, univers al human
rights.,,120 This suggests that there is added strength on the side of ensuring fairness to
the accused in the international criminal law tradition, perhaps at the cost of extending
humanitarian protection - the other competing tension. Indeed, the normative thrust of
international human rights law has now been formaIly entrenched in Article 21 (3) of the
Rome Statute of the ICC, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, as part ofthis broader
trend in international criminal law.

119

This provision states that "[t]he application and

May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 728, 733, n. 22.

120 Christoph J. M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001) at 367.
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interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights [... ]".121

Filling Gaps in Applicable Law in Practice
Moving from the theoretical towards a more empirical analysis, a selective review of the
jurisprudence of the modem ad hoc tribunals demonstrates that real gaps have arisen in
practice by simply resorting to the public international law sources and interpretive
doctrines discussed above. This inquiry is relevant for three purposes. First, it suggests
that the balance in the international criminal law tradition between extending
humanitarian protection and maximizing the protections of the accused has been highly
variable. Secondly, it shows that lacunae in international criminallaw do not exist merely
~

..

where there is no definition of applicable law, as was the case in Chapter 1 concerning its
early origins, but rather are a systematic concern that has not been addressed by the
adoption of a de facto articulation of the applicable law (i.e. Article 38(1) of the lCJ
Statute, discussed above).

Therefore, there is no basis to assume that a de jure

articulation of sources of law, as in Article 21 of the Rome Statute, will definitively
address this concern. 122

Thirdly, this inquiry demonstrates that problems arising from the hybrid character of
international criminallaw have been deal with, at least in part, by judges at the modem ad
hoc tribunals treating national laws as constituting transnational co mm on laws (as

described by Glenn above) which the judges have drawn upon based on their persuasive
121

ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(3).

122

This specifie hypothesis is examined in Chapter 3.
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force. In this way, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, discussed in Chapter 3, can be
seen to reflect a codification of this approach which eschews the prospect of deriving
rules of international custom from national laws, in favour of "general principles of law

derived by the Court from nationallaws of legal systems of the world". 123 Over time, the
cumulative effect of international judicial decision-making on this basis is a body of
persuasive jurisprudence, such that resort to national laws has become less and less
necessary at the modem ad hoc tribunals. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this process
of building an international criminallaw tradition on the basis of persuasive, non-binding
decisions has been entrenched in Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute. 124

Problems in Identijjing International eustom

The ICTY Appeals Chamber's decision on jurisdiction in Tadié is a foundational case in
many respects for the modem ad hoc tribunals, not the least of which is because it is one
of the very first decisions rendered by an international criminal tribunal since the postWWII proceedings. This decision also affords a typical example of the way in which
these tribunals have approached the task of invoking various sources of law to resolve
questions that are not answered in the formaI law of these tribunals (i.e. the relevant
statutory provisions in their Statutes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence).

In Tadié, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that violations of customary rules governing
internaI armed conflicts may incur individual criminal responsibility. It reached this

123

ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 2 1(1)(c) [emphasis added].

124 "The Court may apply principles and mIes of law as interpreted in its previous decisions"; ibid., art.
21(2) [emphasis added].
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conclusion, inter alia, extending the rule in international armed conflicts established by
the IMT by implicitly invoking the Martens clause, stating: "[p ]rinciples and rules of
humanitarian law reflect 'elementary considerations of humanity' widely recognized as
the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind. No one can doubt the
gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest of the international community in their
prohibition.,,125 Placing the Martens Clause, whose role in international criminallaw had
been historically challenged as discussed in Chapter 1, so centrally in this decision has the
effect of inserting a dynarnic normative vehicle for extending hurnanitarian protection in
international criminal law, clearly at the expense of the competing interests of ensuring
fairness to the accused. Without the Tadié decision on jurisdiction, virtually all of the
indictments issued by the ICTY would be a nullity.

The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadié further added that customary international law
arrives at the same conclusion. State practice in the following jurisdictions was cited:
Belgium (statute), Germany (military manual), New Zealand (military manual), United
States (military manual), United Kingdom (military manual), former Socialist Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia (criminal code), the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (decree
law) , and Nigeria (military manual, court martial and civilian court decisions).126 With
respect to opinio juris, the Appeals Charnber relied solely on several U.N. Security
Council resolutions regarding the situation in Somalia. 127 The parties to the conflict in

125

Tadié, Appeals Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 78, para. 129.
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Ibid.,paras. 106,125,130,131.
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Ibid., para. 133.
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/~.

Bosnia-Herzegovina were also found to have agreed in a treaty to punish violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the internaI armed conflict. 128

The approach of the ICTY to finding this very significant rule of customary international
law can hardly be classified as rigorous, neither in depth nor breadth of analysis. Only
eight jurisdictions were considered, just one of which was a non-Western country. The
persuasiveness of relying so heavily on the State practice of jurisdictions which have not
had to deal with internaI armed conflicts is troubling. Other than in the Nigerian law
analysis, there is only cursory citation of provisions in military manuals or national
legislation, without any doctrinal support or analysis to lend credibility to the ICTY's
interpretation of these provisions. Again, other than a few Nigerian cases, the actual uses
of the legislative provisions that exist to purportedly punish violations of international
humanitarian law in internaI armed conflict are absent. Furthermore, no link is made
whatsoever between State practice, on the one hand, and opinio juris on the other. They
are disjunctively treated - not linked in either time or jurisdictional space.

Similar observations apply at the ICTR, as in Kabiligi. In that case, Defence Counsel
claimed, inter alia, that the indictment was defective on the grounds that it dealt with
allegations before the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR. The Trial Chamber decided that
"[a]s to the conspiracy charge, the Trial Chamber finds that the limited temporal
jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not bar evidence of an alleged conspiracy of which the

128

Ibid., para. 136.
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agreement was made before 1994.,,129 In arriving at this conclusion, the ICTR Trial
Chamber relied on an Australian doctrinal text, case law of the House of Lords, and a
decision of a U.S. military tribunal. Based on these sources of law, the ICTR Trial
Chamber concluded that the law on conspiracy as it applies to temporal jurisdiction was
"clear from the authorities" .130

The foregoing critique is significant because it fundamentally questions the theoretical
basis for seeking out customary international law ru/es to be applied in the international
criminal law tradition.

It also suggests that the balance in this tradition between

extending humanitarian protection versus maximizing princip les of a fair defence has
been strongly influenced by developments in international humanitarian law and
international human rights law - a trend confirmed by the Erdemovié case, discussed
below.

Reconciling Differences between National Legal Traditions
A critical review of the jurisprudence of the modem ad hoc tribunals reveals many
instances where these judges were required to answer questions which were unaddressed
in their formallaw (i.e. their Statutes, and Rules of Procedure and Evidence) by resorting
to nationallaws - which themselves were vastly different or seen to be in conflict. Given
such a divergence or conflict among national legal sources, it cannot be argued that these
judges were applying international customary law, or 'general principles of law'. Yet,
129 Prosecutor v. Gratien Kabiligi and Aloys Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-96-34-I, Trial Chamber, Decision
on the Defence Motions Objecting to a Lack of Jurisdiction and Seeking to Declare the Indictment Void Ab
Initio, 13 April 2000, para. 39.
130

Ibid., para. 43.
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they nevertheless arrived at a definitive staternent of the law, sornetirnes opting to follow
one legal tradition over another, and at other tirnes, fashioning their own articulation of
the appropriate rule. This body of practice offers strong evidence of a basic elernent of
the international crirninal law tradition: that it is largely based on judicial discretion in
difficult cases, exercised consistent with Glenn's theory of transnational cornrnon laws,
often based on favouring either extending hurnanitarian protection or enhancing fairness
to the accused.

The ICTY Trial Charnber decision on hearsay in Tadié is paradigrnatic of the above
hypothesis. In that case, the parties disagreed on whether the cornrnon law or civilian
approach to resolving this legal question, which was not explicitly addressed in the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, should prevail. Defence Counsel recognized that national
rules of evidence do not bind the ICTY, but argued that the adversarial system of trial is
more sirnilar to cornrnon law jurisdictions which generally presurnptively exclude hearsay
evidence, with exceptions only where its probative value substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effects. l3l On the other side, the Prosecution argued that the ICTY judges are
finders of fact in a rnanner akin to professional civilian judges, where aIl relevant
evidence is generally adrnissible.132 In resolving this impasse, the Trial Charnber noted
that there was no general rule excluding hearsay in the ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, and cited Rule 89, discussed earlier. 133

The Trial Charnber proceeded to

examine the divergent civilian and cornrnon law approaches to hearsay evidence, and
131 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion on
Hearsay, 5 August 1996, para. 2 [Tadié, Hearsay Decision; on file with author].
132

Ibid., para. 3.

133
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noted that the ICTY itself is a "unique amalgam of civil and common law features" .134 ln
articulating its approach under international criminal law to hearsay evidence, the Trial
Chamber stated that it would admit relevant evidence which has probative value,
"focusing on its reliability,,135 such that it "may be guided by, but not bound to, hearsay
exceptions generally recognized by sorne nationallegal systems". 136 Therefore, the Trial
Chamber developed a sui generis 137 articulation of the law on hearsay by drawing from
both common law and civilian traditions - but not adopting either completely - and
justified this approach as falling within the scope of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
and being "the most efficient and fair method".138 Indeed, a recent survey of ICTY and
ICTR evidentiary law jurisprudence has confirmed the view that judges play a prominent
law-making role in reconciling national legal traditions. 139 There was no attempt by the
ICTY Trial Chamber to justify its solution as being a 'rule of international customary
law' or 'general principle oflaw'. The Tadié decision on hearsay may thus be viewed as
a case of reconciling national legal traditions which are non-binding, but persuasive
sources of law for international criminallaw.

ln the Erdemovié decision on duress, it was not simply the parties, but also the judges of
the ICTY Appeals Chamber which were split on whether duress constituted a complete
134

Ibid, para. 14.

135

Ibid., para. 19.

136

Ibid.

137 This language was not formally used until the DelaUé case: see Prosecutor v. Zejnil DelaUé, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Motion on Presentation of Evidence by the Accused, May 1,
1997.

138

Tadié, Hearsay Decision, supra note 131, para. 19.

139 See May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 727: "Thus, the presentation of evidence has followed the
'adversarial' mode l, whereas the mIes goveming the admissibility of evidence may be seen as more akin to
the 'inquisitorial' model and leave wide discretion to the judges."
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defence to war crimes or crimes against humanity involving the 'killing of innocent
people'. The five-member panel agreed that this question was unresolved in the ICTY
Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and international treaties. They also agreed
that there was a rift between civilian jurisdictions that permitted duress as a complete
defence to aU offences, and common law jurisdictions that generaUy denied duress in
cases of murder, but treated it as a mitigating factor at sentencing.

Despite this

consensus, there was deep division in the Appeals Chamber regarding the basis on which
the issue should be resolved, and four separate opinions were rendered.

The majority in Erdemovié, composed of Judge McDonald, Judge Vohrah and Judge Li
found "that duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime
against humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.,,140
They resolved the gap in international criminal law by explicitly resorting to 'practical
poHcy considerations', namely the imperative of extending humanitarian protection to
deny duress as a defence to the killing of innocent people. Judge Cassese and Judge
Stephen dissented, each writing separate opinions. Judge Cassese's denial of ambiguity
in international criminal law on this issue is suspect, and his admission that if there was
ambiguity, it should be resolved in favour of the accused is quite telling. For its part,
Judge Stephen's dissenting opinion mirrors Glenn's theory of transnational common
laws, with the civilian approach to duress being more persuasive and more suitable to the
interests of justice.

140 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgement, Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997,
para. 19.
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Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah began their analysis by citing Article 38 of the IeJ
Statute under a heading entitled 'Applicable Law' .141 They turned to consider customary
internationallaw and then general princip les of law to ascertain whether duress could be a
defence to the aUeged offence. In evaluating the state of customary international law,
case law of the post-WWII military tribunals was evaluated.

The Einsatzgruppen

decision of the V.S. Military Tribunal was challenged for failing to cite any authority for
its statement that duress could be a complete defence, and Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah found it was "in discord with the preponderant view of international
authorities".142 They also rejected case law from Germany, Belgium, Israel, France, the
former V.S.S.R., the former Yugoslavia, and Italy which had been offered to support the
view of duress as a complete defence, stating that these cases "are insufficient to support
the finding of a customary rule [ ... ] a number of the cases are of questionable relevance
and authority.,,143 Turning to nationallegislation, they found there was no uniform state
practice. They observed the clear split between the civil and common law tradition on
this issue.

Defence Counsel provided evidence that at least fourteen civil law

jurisdictions (including the former Yugoslavia) permit necessity or duress to be
exculpatory for aU crimes. 144 However, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah noted that

141

Erdemovié, Judges McDonald and Vohrah, supra note 35, para. 40.

142 Ibid, para. 44. The D.S. Military Tribunal had held as follows: "Let it be said at once that there is no law
which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid comm,itting
a crime which he condemns. The threat, however, must be imminent, real and inevitable. No court will
punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is compelled to pull a lethallever.": cited in ibid, para.
43.
143

Ibid, para. 48.

144 The jurisdictions included Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Italy, Finland, the Netherlands, France,
Germany, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and the former Yugoslavia: ibid, para. 49.
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common law jurisdictions reject duress as a defence to murder, with the exception of "a
few states" in the United States. 145

Turning to general principles of law, differences between civilian, common law, and
'other' systems (e.g. Japan, China, Morocco, Somalia, and Ethiopia) were provided. After
this basic review, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah engaged in a more detailed
assessment of how duress operates in civilian jurisdictions in practice. However, they
were unable to reconcile the diverse approaches in nationallaw, stating:
It is clear from the differing positions of the principal le gal systems ofthe world that there

is no consistent concrete role which answers the question whether or not duress is a
defence to the killing of innocent persons. It is not possible to reconcile the opposing
positions and, indeed, we do not believe that the issue should be reduced to a contest
between common law and civillaw. 146

To set out an 'applicable rule' governing duress in the case, Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah appealed to the "normative mandate of international criminal law". 147 In so
doing, they explicitly opted to decide the case based on extending humanitarian
protection (arguably at the expense of ensuring fairness to the accused), stating:
we are operating in the realm of international humanitarian law which has, as one of its
prime objectives, the protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their
lives and security are endangered [ ... ] It must be our concern to facilitate the
development and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to promote its aims
and application by recognising the normative effect which criminallaw should have upon
those subject to them. 148

A fundamental tension in the international criminallaw tradition is at the very crux of this
'tough case' in which a clear gap existed in the existing corpus of international criminal
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law. While rejecting duress as a defence on the basis of the policy behind international
humanitarian law, Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah still gave sorne credence to the
competing tension in international criminallaw with respect to fairness to the accused, by
stating that duress can operate as a mitigating factor at sentencing. 149 It must be stressed
that it was not international humanitarian law itself which provided the answer for Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, indeed it is silent on criminal defences, but rather the
general policy behind international humanitarian law. These judges were unapologetic in
their explanation of the final basis for their decision to deny duress as a defence to the
offences alleged, indicating it is not grounded, strictly speaking, in pre-existing law:
We do not think our reference to considerations ofpolicy are improper. It would be naive
to believe that international law operates and develops wholly divorced from
considerations of social and economic policy [ ... ] The approach we take does not involve
a balancing ofharms for and against killing but rests upon an application in the context of
international humanitarian law of the mIe that duress does not justify or excuse the killing
of an innocent person. 150

Similarly, Judge Li's concurring opinion was founded largely on extending humanitarian
protection, but also explicitly drew on those nationallaws which are 'best suited' to the
context of the case.

This approach demonstrated resort to the persuasiveness of

transnational common laws, such that "this International Tribunal cannot but opt for the
solution best suited for the protection of innocent persons.,,151 The majority decision in
Erdemovié, therefore, cannot be said to be grounded in Article 38(1) of the IeJ Statute-

these general doctrines of public international law having failed to provide an answer to
the fundamental question at stake in Erdemovié, at least according to the majority's
reasoning.
149

See ibid., paras. 86-7.

150
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151 Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovié, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li,
Appeals Chamber, 7 October 1997, para. 8.
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On the other side of the debate, Judge Cassese held in his dissenting opinion that
"international criminallaw on duress is not ambiguous or uncertain".152 He proceeded by
identifying four conditions which must be satisfied in order for duress to provide a
defence under international criminal law, based on "relevant case-Iaw [that] is almost
unanimous,,153 (i.e. severity of threat, no means of escape, proportionality of me ans taken,
and threat not self-induced). The 'relevant case-Iaw' cited by Judge Cassese consisted of
several decisions of the post-WWII military tribunal s, and national de ci si ons from the
Netherlands, Israel and Canada. 154

These provided, according to Judge Cassese's

reasoning for a 'general rule' of customary international law that duress may offer a
defence to an accused. Judge Cassese described the Prosecution as attempting to fashion
an 'exception' in customary internationallaw to disallow duress as a defence for offences
involving the 'killing of innocent persons' .155 Judge Cassese argued that the "manifest
inconsistency of State practice warrants the dismissal of the Prosecution's contention: no
special customary rule has evolved in international law on whether or not duress can be
admitted as a defence in case of crimes involving the killing of pers ons" .156 The logic
applied by Judge Cassese on this point is quite malleable and, therefore, suspect. It could
just as easily be argued that a 'general rule' of international criminal law is that the
individual criminal responsibility of an accused can only be negated or excused based on
a defence recognized under internationallaw. Since duress is not recognized as a defence
152
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to the offences charged, and Judge Cassese falls short of finding a 'specifie rule'
permitting duress as a defence to the 'killing of innocent persons', then the purported
defence would not exist.

Judge Cassese is harsh in his criticism of the majority opinions, which he characterized as
being based solely on 'extraneous' public policy considerations:
the majority of the Appeals Chamber has embarked upon a detailed investigation of
'practical policy considerations' and has concluded by upholding 'policy considerations'
substantially based on English law. 1 submit that this examination is extraneous to the task
of our Tribunal. This International Tribunal is called upon to apply internationallaw, in
particular our Statute and principles and roles of international humanitarian law and
international criminallaw. Our International Tribunal is a court of law; it is bound only
by international law. It should therefore refrain from engaging in meta-Iegal analyses.
[ ... ] What is even more important, a policy-oriented approach in the area of criminallaw
runs contrary to the fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege. 157

While rejecting 'policy considerations' as a relevant basis of decisions by international
criminal tribunals, later in his dissenting opinion Judge Cassese nevertheless buttresses
his position in a section entitled 'Concluding considerations' by invoking what could
reasonably be called policy considerations, stating: "Law is based on what society can
reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of behaviour
which require mankind to perform acts of martyrdom, and brand as criminal any
behaviour falling below those standards.,,158

In a very revealing passage, Judge Cassese stated that ifthere was ambiguity or a gap in
international criminal law concerning duress, then the ICTY should have made
"appropriate and judicious [... ] recourse - as a last resort - to the national legislation of
the accused, rather than to moral considerations or policy-oriented principles," given that
157
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the accused was "required to know those national provisions and base his expectations on
their contents".159 However, there is no authority cited by Judge Cassese for filling gaps
in international criminal law by applying the national law ordinarily applicable to the
accused. His only justification for this approach is: first, that the accused would have
known national law; and second, that applying national law is preferable to applying
princip les of morality or policy considerations. That combatants would have known that
their nationallaw permitted duress as a defence could only be relevant for the purposes of
ensuring legal certainty in armed conflict, or ensuring fairness to an accused who acted in
good faith on what he believed to be legal - Judge Cassese specifically refers to the
maxim in dubio pro reo in this regard. 160 Holding the accused to two different standards,
not knowing which would apply, would be 'unfair' the argument would go. These
considerations, however, which flow from Judge Cassese's reasoning are all arguably
'policy considerations' which he has strenuously argued are generally erroneous before
international tribunals. Therefore, we are brought back to the intractable tension in the
international criminal law tradition between extending humanitarian protection, versus
ensuring fairness to the accused.

In the final dissenting OpInIOn in Erdemovié, Judge Stephen began by disputing the
persuasive authority of the post-WWII jurisprudence on the grounds that they merely
applied the national law that the judges of those courts were most familiar with,161 a
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161 Judge Stephen held: "The post-Second World War military tribunals do not appear to have acted in
relation to duress in conscious conformity with the dictates of international law": Erdemovié, Judge
Stephen, supra note 68, para. 24.
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general contention examined in Chapter 1. Judge Stephen then turned to examine general
principles of law as articulated in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, agreeing with the
theoretical approach articulated by Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah regarding the
ability of general principles to fill lacunae in international law. 162 Characterizing the
divergence of the common law and civilian tradition on this issue, Judge Stephen simply
indicated preference for the latter and justified this decision based on favouring the
tension within international criminal law of ensuring fairness to the accused: "not only
because of the approach of the civil law but also as a matter of simple justice [ ... ] In
searching for a general principle of law the enquiry must go beyond the actual rules and
must seek the reason for their creation and the manner of their application.,,163 Later,
Judge Stephen rejected the competing tension in international criminallaw of extending
humanitarian protection on the facts of the case as alleged, arguing that it "is not achieved
by the denial of a just defence to one who is in no position to effect by his own will the
protection of innocent life.,,164 This reasoning shows hints of a rare attempt to reconcile
the competing aims of international criminallaw.

Judge Stephen proceeded to attack the common law position, interestingly by relying on
sorne common law jurisprudence and doctrine itself which admits that there is an
"absence in the common law of any satisfying and reasoned principle governing the
exclusion of duress in the case of very serious crimes including murder".165

Judge

Stephen also sought to distinguish the common law position since it is "based upon
162
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situations in which an accused has had a choice between his own life and the life of
another as distinct from cases where an accused has no such choice, it being a case of
either death for one or death for both.,,166

However, in a series of questionable moves, Judge Stephen seeks to dec1are a general
principle of law recognizing duress as a defence on that basis that a "general princip le
governing duress is therefore more likely to be found in these general rules [i.e. civilian
rules] than in specific exceptions which exist for particular crimes [i.e. common law
rules].,,167

With respect, this is merely a play-on-words with the word 'general' in

'general principles of law'.

The existence of exceptions to rules of law in national

systems cannot reasonably invalidate those nationallaws from analysis - to the contrary
their divergence from other approaches which do not recognize such exceptions make it
more difficult to dec1are a general principle of law exists.

Based on the preceding

analysis, Judge Stephen purported to dec1are a narrow general principle of law that could
perhaps enable duress to operate on the facts alleged by the accused in the case:
despite the exception which the common law makes to the availability of duress in cases
of murder where the choice is truly between one life or another, the defence of duress can
be adopted into international law as deriving from a general princip le of law recognized
by the world's major legal systems, at least where that exception does not apply [i.e. as in
this case where the choice was allegedly between one life being lost or both being 108t].168

The Erdemovié decision, therefore, represents a microcosm for the development of the
international criminal law tradition, bringing to light its fundamental tensions and basic
aspects which began with its origins at Nuremberg and have only grown more apparent in

166

Ibid., para. 25.
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Ibid., para. 63.

168

Ibid., para. 66.
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concrete cases at the modem ad hoc tribunals. It is a harbinger of the very type of
elementary questions regarding the guilt or acquittaI of an accused which will continue to
faU within the gaps in international criminallaw.

Non-Binding Nature of Transnational Common Laws

While the cases discussed above have dealt with instances where the modem ad hoc
tribunals have fiUed lacunae by relying on the persuasive force of transnational common
laws, often by choosing between favouring humanitarian protection or fairness to the
accused, it is equaUy important to examine the truly non-binding nature of these
transnational common laws by showing cases where they have been deliberately set
aside. 169 Richard May and Marieke Wierda confirm this view, arguing that international
criminal law must not be exclusively grounded in common or civilian law, "or even a
combination of the two" .170 Thus, even where transnational common laws, such as the
common laws of Europe,171 are in complete agreement, they may be denied normative
force. This is a further element of establishing that the concept of transnational common
laws may be the dominant explanatory theory behind the international criminal law
tradition. Sorne clear evidence of this kind is provided in the ICTR Appeal Chamber
decision in Bagosora.

169 This concept has also been codified, in part, in Rule 89(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
these tribunaIs, cited earlier, which denies binding authority to national evidentiary law: ICTY RuIes, supra
note 48, r. 89(A): "A Chamber shaH apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section, and shaH not be
bound by national rules of evidence." ICTR RuIes, supra note 48, r. 89(A): "The rules of evidence set forth
in this Section shaH govem the proceedings before the Chambers. The Chambers shaH not be bound by
national rules of evidence."
170

May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 728.

17l

See Glenn, On Common Laws, supra note 98 at c. 1.
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In that case, the Prosecutor argued that there was an inherent right of appeal against the
decision of the confirming judge to dismiss the indictment. Among other arguments, the
Prosecutor unsuccessfully sought to rely on provisions in national jurisdictions in both
civilian and common law systems as evidence of a general principle of law.

The

reasoning of the ICTR Appeals Chamber in rejecting this argument is not easily
understood without resort to Glenn's theory of transnational common laws:
46. The Prosecutor submits that an inherent right of appeal may be founded on the
practice of courts in national jurisdictions. It is argued that a survey of national law
indicates the existence of a general princip le of law that, in the absence of an express
provision to the contrary, a right of appeal generally lies from the decisions of a lower
court. The Prosecutor cites provisions from the Codes of Criminal Procedure of the civil
law jurisdictions of France, Senegal and Germany, where decisions of lower courts
dismissing an indictment may always be appealed to a superior court, and the remedies of
mandamus and certiorari in the common law jurisdictions of the United States and the
United Kingdom.
47. In the view of the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber may extrapolate an analogue of
such rules to find jurisdiction in the instant appeal. The Prosecutor argues that general
principles of law may be applied by international courts, citing, inter alia, Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the ICTY.
48. The Appeals Chamber notes, however, that each of the rules cited by the Prosecutor is
based on an explicit statutory provision in the national jurisdiction concerned. The
Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds them inapplicable in the instant matter. 172

If we take the ICTR Appeals Chamber's reasons in Bagosora at face value, it is difficult
to envisage a situation where it could ever fill lacunae in its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence by resort to general principles of law. The fact that the rules governing inherent
rights of appeal are codified in nationallegislation, as opposed to sorne other form such as
case law, is entirely irrelevant.

Indeed, if an international criminal tribunal should

generally completely ignore nationallaws simply on account of their codification (which
is different from considering them and finding them unpersuasive), it would be prohibited
from considering the civilian legal tradition, and indeed, many common law jurisdictions
~"

172

Bagosora, Appeals Decision, supra note 92, paras. 46-9 [footnotes omitted].
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which have codified much of their criminal law. Therefore, the reasons of the ICTR
Appeals Chamber in Bagosora must be recast: its true reasons for denying an inherent
right of appeal are opaque or hidden, much in the way that certain decisions made by the
IMT were not fully reasoned, as discussed in Chapter 1. Bagosora can be understood as
affirming the non-binding nature of transnational common laws. While it may be that
accord among these transnational common laws would typically make them more
persuasive, this never excludes the possibility that international judges may refuse to
follow them. Such an outcome is fully accommodated in Glenn's the ory of transnational
common laws.

Precedence and an International Criminal Jurisprudence

Once they have been made, what role do national and international judicial decisions play
in the international criminal law tradition? Consistent with Glenn's the ory of
transnational common laws, we would expect them to play a persuasive, but non-binding
role. This is largely the approach which has been taken at the modern ad hoc tribunals.

With respect to judicial decisions made outside its Chambers, the ICTY has not
considered itself to be 'bound' by the decisions of other international courts or tribunals
such as the IMT or IMTFE,173 but stated that these are merely more persuasive than
national decisions:
In sum, international criminal courts such as the International Tribunal must always
carefully appraise decisions of other courts before relying on their persuasive authority as
to existing law. Moreover, they should apply a stricter level of scrutiny to national
decisions than to international judgements, as the latter are at least based on the same
173 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskié, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 14 January 2000,
para. 540 [Kuprdkié, Trial Judgement].
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corpus of law as that applied by international courts, whereas the former tend to apply
nationallaw, or primarily that law, or el se interpret international rules through the prism
ofnationallegislation. 174

What of its own jurisprudence? The treatment given to prior decisions of the Trial and
Appeals Chambers of the modem ad hoc tribunals is not explicitly addressed in either
their Statutes or Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 175 This situation presents a dilemma
given the position on this issue of various streams which feed into the international
criminal law tradition. While higher courts in the common law tradition may bind lower
courts by their decisions, there is no similar legal requirement in civilian traditions. 176 In
public international law, as in Article 59 of the l Cl Statute,t 77 binding precedence is not
strongly conceived.

In 2000, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski definitively stated that the "ratio
decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial Chambers", owing to: the hierarchical

structure of the tribunal; the need to ensure "certainty and predictability in the application
of the applicable law" (similar wording to Control Council Law No. 10, discussed in
Chapter 1); fairness to the accused because like cases must be treated alike (favouring one
of the fundamental poles in the international criminal law tradition); and the intention of
the U.N. Security Council in creating the tribunals which "envisaged a tribunal
comprising three trial chambers and one appeals chamber, applying a single, unified,
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Ibid., para. 542.
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Claire Harris, "Precedence in the Practice of the ICTY" in May, supra note 108 at 341.

176 Discussed in Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 24
March 2000, para. 112 [Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement].
177 ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 59: "The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the
parties and in respect ofthat particular case."
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coherent and rational corpus of law.,,178 With respect to decisions of Trial Chambers, the
Appeals Chamber essentially adopted the shared common law and civilian approach,
stating that other Trial Chambers may find such decisions to be persuasive, but that they
have "no binding force on each other". 179

The fundamental question of whether the Appeals Chamber is bound by its own prior
decisions was also addressed in Aleksovski, where the Prosecution argued for the common
law position of stare decisis which is only departed from if a previous decision is 'c1early
erroneous and cannot stand', even though it was recognized that this is not a general
principle of law. On the other hand, the Defence argued that "the Tribunal may apply
only rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of
customary law, and the Report [of the U.N. Secretary General creating the ICTY] makes
no mention of judicial precedence as a source of law.,,180 Resolving this question, the
Appeals Chamber observed that the "trend which emerges from an examination of
common law jurisdictions is that their highest courts will normally consider themselves
bound by their previous decisions, but reserve the right to depart from them in certain
circumstances.,,181 While the highest courts in civilian jurisdictions tend in practice to
follow their prior decisions, the Appeals Chamber noted that this is not because such
decisions are viewed as binding. 182 International courts similarly do not have a notion of
binding precedence, but afford their prior decisions significant weight.
178

Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 176, para. 113.
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Ibid., para. 114.
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Harris, supra note 175 at 346.
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Aleksovski, Appeals Judgement, supra note 176, para. 92.
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Chamber found this practice to be non-determinative, and instead resolved the issue based
on the need for "certainty, stability and predictability in criminallaw", 183 and the right of
the accused to a fair trial which includes the right of appeal where like cases are treated
alike as weIl as where errors of law in past appellate decisions are corrected. 184 The
ultimate rule adopted in Aleksovski, therefore, was that "the Appeals Chamber should
follow its previous decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in
the interests ofjustice.,,185

Taken together, the approach of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski to the nature of
prior Appeals Chamber decisions to other Trial Chambers, and subsequent Appeals
Chambers, may be seen as an attempt to reconcile the typically competing aspects of the
international criminal law tradition.

By ensuring Appeals Chambers' decisions are

binding on Trial Chambers, and should generally be followed by subsequent Appeals
Chambers, international criminal law can develop over time and be applied clearly and
concisely, thus enhancing humanitarian protection.

Likewise, the rule encourages

fairness to the accused by ensuring that like cases are treated alike, but allows for the
exception that a prior Appeals Chamber decision may be disregarded where it is contrary
to the interests of justice.

Moving forward, it is pertinent to consider the extent to which the jurisprudence of the
modern ad hoc tribunals may serve as persuasive, non-binding precedence for the ICC.
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Ibid., para. 101.
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Only time will tell the answer to this question, but it is already apparent in the Rome
Statute that sorne of the case law of the modem ad hoc tribunals has been set aside. For
example, the majority decision in Erdemovié regarding the defence of duress was not
followed in the drafting of the defences section of the Rome Statute. 186 Furthermore, how
will the decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and Appeals Chamber
be treated in other cases before the ICC? Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute appears to
retreat from the approach of the common law tradition and the modem ad hoc tribunal s,
instead favouring an approach of mere persuasive authority akin to the civilian tradition,
stating: "[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.,,187 These issues will be addressed in further detail in Chapter 3.

Significance of MaturingJudicial Institutional Structure
The advent of the modem ad hoc tribunals represents a crucial step in the development of
international criminal law. Their jurisprudence establishes sorne basic continuity with
key principles from the post-WWII tribunal s, most notably individual criminal
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law.

The judicial

institutions of the modem ad hoc tribunals have played an important role in advancing
international criminallaw in several ways.

First, unlike the IMT which was concerned with only one mega-trial to prosecute
individuals on one side of an armed conflict, the modem ad hoc tribunals have prosecuted

186 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, An Introduction to the Law of the International Criminal Tribunals
(Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, Ine., 2003) at 74; see ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 3 1(l)(d).
187

ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21(2).
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dozens of accused on different sides of their respective armed conflicts. These multiple
proceedings have resulted in hundreds of decisions being made on evidentiary and
procedural matters, and dozens of landmark judgments on substantive matters of
international criminal law.

This has enabled the refinement and development of

evidentiary, procedural and substantive law in a way that would not have been possible
otherwise. The jurisprudence thus represents a growing corpus of international criminal
law.

Second, unlike the post-WWII tribunals which were only loosely affiliated and did not
have an appellate structure, the ICTY and ICTR have a common Appeals Chamber and
other institutional connections that have facilitated a more coherent development of
international criminal law. Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash explain that the "intention
behind these common institutions was the development of a balanced and coherent
jurisprudence, which has evidently been achieved.,,188 While they were created as nonpermanent tribunals, the "[t]he creation of the Rwanda Tribunal showed that the
machinery designed for the Yugoslavia Tribunal could be employed for other specifie
circumstances and offenses, thereby avoiding the need to reinvent the wheel in response
to each global humanitarian crisis.,,189 On the other hand, it should be noted that "at least
one permanent member of the Security Council, China, has openly expressed concern

188 Ilias Bantekas & Susan Nash, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd.,
2003) at 340; see ICTR Statute, supra note 47, art. 12(2).
189 Michael P. Scharf, "The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadié: An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes
Trial Since Nuremberg" (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 861 at 880.
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about using the Yugoslavia Tribunal as precedent for the creation of other ad hoc criminal
tribunals,,190

Third, the judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals are not nationals of the victorious parties
of the armed conflict, or their allies, as was the case with the post-WWII tribunals, but
rather have been elected by the V.N. General Assembly from nominations provided to the
V.N. Security Council by Member States, "taking due account of the adequate

representation of the principallegal systems of the world.,,191 Additionally, guidelines for
the geographic distribution of staff members in Chambers who advise the judges of the
modem ad hoc tribunals also helps to ensure that more national laws become accessible
as a matter of practice to Chambers. The legal tradition from which these judges hail has
been noted by commentators. For example, in the Tadié decision on hearsay, Richard
May and Marieke Wierda noted that "[t]his ruling from a Trial Chamber composed of
essentially common law judges was approved and followed by another Trial Chamber of
essentially civillaw judges in another case". 192

Fourth, the office of the President of the Tribunal is a significant institutional feature of
the modem ad hoc tribunals. In addition to presiding over both the ICTY and ICTR
Appeals Chamber, the role of the President has developed substantially to encompass
judicial, administrative, diplomatie and even political functions. The President has

190

Ibid., at 881.
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ICTY Statute, supra note 47, arts. 13bis(1)(c), 13ter(1)(c); see also Kittichaisaree, supra note Il at 23.

192 May & Wierda, 1999, supra note 18 at 747 citing Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskié, Case No. IT-95-14,
Trial Chamber, Decision, 21 January 1998.
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facilitated the rule-making function of the judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals in the
process of improving the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 193

Finally, and perhaps most significant from the perspective of the ICC's institutional
structure, the modem ad hoc tribunals did not have any external quasi-Iegislative body to
enact, approve or amend their respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence, nor to change
the substantive law they declared, as the case may be.

Judge Hunt in Aleksovski

recognized the implications of institutional constraints at the international level in
developing and refining international criminal law, stating: "unlike in domestic systems,
there is no legislative body readily able to fine-tune its Statute when a decision of the
Appeals Chamber is subsequently seen to have produced an injustice. It is quite
unrealistic to expect the Security Council of the United Nations to perform that task.,,194
Similarly, in Erdemovié, Judge Cassese addressed the significance of institutional
differences between national and international criminal courts:
The philosophy behind aU national criminal proceedings, whether they take a commonlaw or a civil-Iaw approach, is unique to those proceedings and stems from the fact that
national courts operate in a context where the three fundamental functions (law-making,
adjudication and law enforcement) are discharged by central organs partaking of the
State's direct authority over individuals. That logic cannot be simply transposed onto the
international level: there, a different logic imposed by the different position and role of
courts must perforee inspire and govern international criminal proceedings. 195

The role of the Assembly of States Parties in relation to the ICC adds an interesting reply
to these statements by Judge Hunt and Judge Cassese, which will be discussed in Chapter
3.
Jon Cina and David Tolbert, "The Office of the President: A Third Voice" in May, supra note 108 at 86-
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Conclusion
While the creation of the modem ad hoc tribunals makes it possible to conceive of an
emergent international criminal law tradition, the foregoing analysis shows that their
attempts to theoretically define sources of law and interpretive principles solely by
reference to public international law has been insufficient. In practice, gaps which have
emerged in the de facto definition of applicable law taken from Article 38 of the leJ
Statute have been filled by resort to judicial discretion which draws upon persuasive, nonbinding precedent from transnational common laws.

In sorne cases, the persuasive

rationale is unstated by these judges, or weak attempts are made to justify their decisions
as fully consistent with general principles of public international law. However, notable
instances in the jurisprudence have been presented which demonstrate that the
fundarnental debate in the international criminal law tradition between enhancing
hurnanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the accused has been the turning point
in difficult cases. In rare instances, there have been attempts to reconcile these competing
aims which have been at the core of the international criminallaw tradition since its birth.
As these decisions have accurnulated over time at the modem ad hoc tribunals, a basic
system of precedence has been adopted to attempt to achieve an agenda of reconciling
these aims.

Why then has the recent trend in international criminal law since the modem ad hoc
tribunals been to attempt to codify the sources of applicable law, alter the way in which
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this body of law should evolve, and revise the type of precedence which should apply?196
In particular, how does Article 21 of the Rome Statute, and the institutional structure of
the ICC, differ from the approach that has prevailed at the modem ad hoc tribunals?
Does it purport to fill gaps in international criminallaw, and, if so, how effective is it in
doing so? How does it affect the fundamental tensions in the international criminallaw
tradition between enhancing humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the
accused?

How could the notion of transnational common laws operate in the ICC

consistent with, or in spite of, Article 21 of the Rome Statute? What is the nature of past
decisions of the ICC in this new system? These are the fundamental questions

ln

sustaining the international criminallaw tradition to which Chapter 3 is directed.

196 See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 37, art. 21; United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor,
Regulation No. 2000/15, On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal
Offences,
UNTAETIREG/2000/15,
6
June
2000,
s.
3,
online:
United
Nations
<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetRlRegOOI5E.pdf>; Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, adopted on 16 January 2002, as amended to 14 May 2005, r. 72bis, online: SCSL
<http://www.sc-sl.org/rulesofprocedureandevidence.pdf>; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in
Report the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55 th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), arts. 14, 19(1), 20(3), online: SCSL <http://www.sc-sl.org/scslstatute.html>; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 10 December 2003, art. 17, online: Coalition
Provisional Authority <http://www.cpa-iraq.orglhumanJights/Statute.htm> .
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3

Sustaining the International Criminal Law Tradition: ICC

The project of creating a permanent international criminal court has a long history, but
only really gained traction around the same time that the first modem ad hoc was being
established. Owing to the fact that the negotiation process of drafting a statute for the
ICC took place alongside the developments discussed in Chapter 2, the modem ad hoc
tribunals continued to promulgate important jurisprudence weIl after the Rome Statute
was finalized. The thinking that went into the ICC, therefore, represents an effort to build
on the early lessons from these tribunal s, as well as an independent exercise in redefining
the international criminal law tradition - without the benefit of the full experience of the
modem ad hoc tribunals.

There are many important differences between the Rome

Statute and the substantive, procedural and evidentiary law developed by the modem ad
hoc tribunals, but the most germane for the purposes of this thesis is Article 21, which for

the first time in history seeks to elucidate sources of international criminal law. 197 This
provision states:
Article 21
Applicable law

1. The Court shaH apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles
and mIes of international law, including the established principles of the
internationallaw of armed conflict;

197 Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman, "Article 21: Applicable Law" in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden-Baden: Nomos VerlagsgeseHschaft, 1999),
435 at 438.
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(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the nationallaws of
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that
those princip les are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law
and internationally recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply princip les and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3/ 98 age, race,
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status. 199

Article 21 of the Rome Statute is worded in a very cumbersome manner. It can only be
understood in the context in which it was drafted: by round after round of negotiation and
compromise. It raises the most theoretical as well as the most practical challenges to the
viability of the international criminal law tradition. The justification for the provision is
both to provide a normative super-structure to the tradition, as well as fill gaps in the law
to be applied. However, as will be seen, it may fail to meet either of these objectives and
risks undermining the entire project of the ICC.

While the Rome Statute formally restricts the law-making authority of international
judges with respect to procedural and evidentiary law in many ways, there is ample room
in Article 21 to determine the law. The fundamental tensions in the international criminal
law tradition between extending humanitarian protection and ensuring fairness to the
accused have been aggravated, both in terms of specifie rules as well as institutional
arrangements. The operation of Article 21 confirms the hypothesis that Glenn's theory of

.~.

198 Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute relates to crimes against humanity and states: "For the purpose of this
Statute, it is understood that the term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context
of society. The term 'gender' does not indicate any meaning different from the above.": ICC Statute, supra
note 37, art. 7(3) .
199

Ibid., art. 21.
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transnational common laws has a strong explanatory value for what is going on in the
application of law. Finally, the long-term viability of the ICC remains an open question
on the terms of Article 21 (2), and two competing visions will be presented of the future of
the international criminal law tradition in this regard.

The possibility of a coherent

jurisprudence developing in light of these significant obstacles is by no means certain.

Aims of the Applicable Law Provision
Why was a de jure provision on 'applicable law' required in light of the de facto
applicable law provisions applied by the modem ad hoc tribunals and historical tribunals?
Without debating the content of such a provision, its mere existence is the first juncture
for analysis. Article 21 of the Rome Statute has been called "a tissue of imperfectly
defined sources",200 and its adoption has been justified on several grounds - which may
be se en as recurring themes in the development of international criminal law, based on
the foregoing chapters.

First, given the hybrid nature and newness of this tradition, an applicable law provision
was thought necessary to resolve challenges of "normative indeterminacy inherent in the
development of internationallegal norms.,,201 The promise of Article 21 in this regard is
to provide a normative framework or structure for the entire legal world overseen by the
ICC.

Second, most commentators agree that Article 21 was designed to serve a 'gap-

filling' function to fill lacunae where substantive, procedural or evidentiary rules are

Alain Pellet, "Applicable Law" in Antonio Cassese et al., eds., The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1051 at 1053.

200

201

de Guzman, supra note 197 at439.
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apparently lacking. 202 An important distinction is made with respect to gap-filling in
national law and in the international criminal law tradition. It has been recognized that
national law is "anchored in a fine network of legal norms [i.e. a legal tradition] that lay
down rules that are intricately interwoven with the codes.,,203
international criminal law has no norms to anchor itself to.

The problem is that
It has no longstanding

tradition, only a tentative and uncertain existence with little theoretical basis. Without an
established tradition behind it, international criminallaw is a law seeking out a tradition hence the paradox ofit being an 'emerging' legal tradition. Ironically, this predicament is
both the root of the problem that Article 21 of the Rome Statute seeks to address, as weIl
as the reason why Article 21 is unlikely to succeed in patching together a legal tradition.

As the analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates, however, resort to transnational
common law has been the way that the modem ad hoc tribunals have generally filled the
most difficult gaps in their statutes, as well as by deciding between tensions of extending
humanitarian protection versus fairness to the accused. The extent to which Article 21
constrains or condones this approach warrants attention.

Before delving into this

analysis, however, it is necessary to situate this provision within the broader
developments in the international criminallaw tradition to understand its implications.

Separation from Tradition of Public International Law

202 J. Verhoeven, "Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Ambiguities of Applicable Law" (2002) 33
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 at 17; de Guzman, supra note 197 at 443; Kittichaisaree,
supra note Il at 52.
203

Pellet, supra note 200 at 1067.
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Article 21 of the Rome Statute represents a split, at least in part, from the dominance of
general public international law in international criminal law. This single source that
could have grounded an international criminallaw tradition, and indeed the source relied
upon by the earlier international criminal tribunals, has been fatally undermined. This is
not to deny the strong and ongoing role of public internationallaw, but merely to identify
that its exclusivity over international criminal law is denied in the Rome Statute and,
therefore, for the definition of this tradition moving forward. This view is not without its
detractors.

To begin with, Margaret McAuliffe de Guzman has noted that while the applicable law
provision in the Rome Statute is generally inspired from Article 38 of the ICI Statute,
Article 21 "modifies the approach taken in the IC] Statute to fit the context of
international criminallaw.,,204

By the time of the Rome Conference, it was clear that

international criminal tribunals were applying Article 38 of the IC] Statute as a matter of
practice. Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome Statute must be viewed as a deliberate
attempt to modify this approach.

There are important differences between these

provisions which go to the heart of the international criminal law tradition. First, while
Article 38 of the IC] Statute places each of its sources of law on equal footing (with the
exception of 'subsidiary' sources such as judicial decisions and teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists), Article 21 of the Rome Statute establishes a hierarchy or
pyramid of sources. Secondly, there is no explicit mention of international custom in
Article 21 of the Rome Statute as there is in Article 38 of the IC] Statute - the former

204

de Guzman, supra note 197 at 436.
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referring to 'principles and rules of internationallaw' .205 Third, Article 21 (3) of the Rome
Statute entrenches internationally recognized human rights as infusing the 'application
and interpretation' of every source of law, whereas no such provision appears in Article
38 of the ICl Statute.

Fourth, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute represents a

significant evolution of the concept of 'general principles of law', which has been lauded
because it "brings useful precision to the definition of general principles of law". 206 Alan
Nissel argues that "this was the most controversial source codified and distinguishes
Article 21 of the Rome Statute from Article 38 of the statute establishing the International
Court of lustice.,,207

Finally, the nature of prior decisions of the court is defined

differently in Article 59 of the ICl Statute compared to Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute.
This issue of precedence will be considered in detaillater.

Despite these significant differences between Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the
general public international law sources, sorne prominent commentators continue to deny
any break has been made with the traditional sources of public international law, as
articulated in Article 38 of the ICl. These scholars still hold to the view, in the face ofthe
plain wording of Article 21 and the record of the negotiations surrounding it, that public
international law continues to reign within the institutions created by the Rome Statute.
ln other words, they deny that it will be applying a law sui generis. Cherif Bassiouni
argues that Article 10 of the Rome Statute "requires the application of international law
205 "While it is clear that custom is included in Article 21 [(1)(b)], it appears that the reason why 'custom'
was not explicitly mentioned was because the concept of gradually evolving custom was considered too
imprecise for the purposes of international criminallaw": Alan Nissel, "Continuing Crimes in the Rome
Statute" (2004) 25 Michigan Journal ofInternational Law 653, n. 142 (Lexis).
206
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whose four sources are listed in Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of
Justice".208

Article 10 of the Rome Statute provides: "Nothing in this Part shall be

interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
internationallaw for purposes other than this Statute.,,209

Bassiouni' s argument is quite weak and his denial that the international criminal law
world changed after Article 21 is not convincing. It may be easily dispatched by focusing
on the explicit wording in Article 10 of the Rome Statute which states 'for purposes other
than this Statute'. Therefore, for the purposes of the Statute, Article 21 would be wholly
and completely applicable.

It would be impossible for the judges to deny it.

Additionally, the ICC, as a creature of the Rome Statute, is governed by this treaty as its
constitutional document. Despite the customary nature in internationallaw of the sources
articulated in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the ICC is bound first to consider the
provisions of its own statute which has been crafted for the specifie purposes to which the
ICC is directed. It is entirely indefensible to argue that an international court should
disregard a provision in its own statute in favor of an analogous, but different, provision
in another international court's statute. Such an approach is dictated by Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, which properly and squarely applies
to the interpretation to be given to the Rome Statute itself. ·Interestingly, Bassiouni agrees
that the ICC must apply these interpretive canons, making his argument circular?10
Therefore, Article 21 of the Rome Statute represents a split from strict adherence to
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Article 38 of the lCl Statute and in so doing, divorces international criminallaw from the
possibility of claiming public international law with its thousands of years of history and
tradition as being the exclusive anchor for the law applied by the lCC in concrete cases.

Restraint in Judicial Law-Making & lnstitutional Change
Another important aspect of the international criminal law tradition which has been
seriously challenged in the Rome Statute is the role of international judges as powerful
agents for law-making. One of the leading commentaries on the Rome Statute de scribes
the fundamental debate on the role of judges at the lCC, and how Article 21 came to
become a battleground on the issue:
Two princip le schools of thought emerged at the Preparatory Committee meetings
regarding the appropriate degree of judicial discretion in disceming applicable law. A
minority of States took the position that the princip le of legality requires the virtual
elimination of judicial discretion in the criminallaw context. Any doubt as to the relevant
legal provision should be resolved, according to this view, by direct application of the
appropriate domestic law. The majority position, on the other hand, sought to
accommodate the unique nature of the international legal order by allowing the judges to
discern and apply general principles of international criminallaw. Article 21 represents a
compromise between these two schools ofthought. 211

There is no agreement, however, in the literature on whether the Rome Statute as a whole
has effectively altered the sc ope of authority of international judges to 'make law'. While
sorne argue "Article 21, therefore, accords a great deal of discretion to the judges at the
lCC",212 others daim "they [the drafters] have shown a mistrust for the judge [sic] that is
reflected in a large number of other provisions of the Statute.,,213 While the judges of the
post-WWII and modem ad hoc tribunals were entrusted with adopting and amending their
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence, this power is largely denied to the judges of the ICC.
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Rome Statute, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(Rules) "shaH enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of
the Assembly of States Parties.,,214 The amending procedure for these Rules is onerous
and could prove problematic, requiring the same level of approval by the Assembly of
States Parties? 15

Article 51(3) provides an exceptional procedure for provisional

amendments of these rules by the judges: "in urgent cases where the Rules do not provide
for a specifie situation before the Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw
up provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary
or special session of the Assembly of States Parties".216 For its part, Rule 63(5) of the
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence prohibits any direct application of national laws,
reinforcing the authority of Article 21 in a redundant manner: "[t]he Chambers shaH not
apply nationallaws goveming evidence, other than in accordance with article 21. ,,217

One commentator has already raised the dilemma of "what happens if the next session of
the Assembly of States Parties rejects a provisional rule
circumstances?,,218

adopted in such

If decisions under the provisional rule were void, the judicial

independence of the ICC could be threatened. If they were not, the accused could claim
unfaimess in application of the rules. The unacceptability of this compromise willlikely
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lay dormant until it arises in a concrete case. It is a significant risk that would be
irresponsible for the ICC to ignore. An even more serious problem relates to the fact that
the Rome Statute itself contains "provisions of a procedural nature [that] could have been
included in the Rules,,?19 If problems relating to those procedural rules arise during the
course of a proceeding, the judges of the ICC would not have recourse to the ability to
provisionally amend the rule, since it would be a statutory provision beyond their reach.
The likelihood of these problems materializing should not be ignored, given that the
judges of the modem ad hoc tribunals had to frequently amend their Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to respond to challenges that arose in concrete cases.

A less serious limitation on the law-making abilities of the ICC judges is existence of the
Elements of Crimes which are also adopted by two-thirds of the Assembly of States
Parties. Article 9 of the Rome Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes "shall assist
the Court in the interpretation and application of article 6, 7 and 8 [genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes].,,220 The combination of the obligatory term 'shall'
with the permissive term 'assist' is strange. Again, the reason for this lies in the nature of
the Rome Statute as a negotiated treaty: "[s]ome delegates, led by the US, wanted the
Elements of Crimes to bind the ICC judges so as to ensure certainty and clarity of the law
of the ICC Statute. Other delegations opposed restriction on the ICC judges in their
interpretation of international criminal law.,,221 The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) commentary on the Elements of Crimes insists they "are to be used as an
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interpretative aid and are not binding upon the judges. The elements must 'be consistent
with this Statute' and it should be emphasized that consistency with the Statute must be
determined by the Court. ,,222

Notwithstanding the apparent limitations on their law-making powers, it has been
postulated "that the judges will interpret the text [of Article 21], at least partially, so as to
recover the powers inherent in all courts, of which the drafters of the Statute clearly
wanted to deprive them.,,223 While this may be true of substantive law given the nonbinding nature of the Elements of Crimes and their cursory nature, within the realm of
procedural and evidentiary law, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that there has been a
genuine shift against judicial discretion.

Deepening Cleavages Between Humanitarian Protection & Fairness to Accused
Rather than attempting to reconcile the tension inherent in the international criminal hlw
tradition between extending humanitarian protection versus ensuring fairness to the
accused, the Rome Statute has only deepened these cleavages. The implications of this
entrenchment of competing ideals within the law and institutions of the ICC are severe
since they go to the very foundations of international cri minaI law. It is not difficult to
envisage a show-down at the ICC of the type that took place at the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Erdemovié. Indeed, the tone of the literature in this regard is particularly

Knut Dormann et al., Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: Sources and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 8 [emphasis added].
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bitter as the tensions between criminal lawyers and human rights activists are laid bare.
There are both substantive and institutional aspects of this phenomenon.

Extending humanitarian protection inevitably occurred in the Rome Statute, given that
numerous humanitarian organizations were involved in negotiations. The Rome Statute is
not merely a codification of existing law. For example, the ICTY Trial Chamber in
Kupreskié found that Article 7(1 )(h) of the Rome Statute on persecution as a crime

against humanity "is not consonant with customary international law",224 and therefore
refused to follow it.

Enhancing fairness to the accused is also embedded in the Rome Statute, similarly
flowing from the efforts of human rights and criminal law advocates during the
negotiations. It has been argued that there are many examples of the '''victory' of the
criminal law approach over the internationalist vision,,?25

In particular, it has been

asserted that "the word 'custom' was excluded [in Article 21], [ ... ] due to the fact that the
criminallawyers, whose influence increased during the drafting of the Statute, opposed it
in the name of an erroneous conception of the principle of the legality of offences and
punishment.,,226 The need for clarity in provisions holding individuals criminally
responsible is repeatedly stressed in the commentary on Article 21. 227
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International human rights law, which operated as a powerful normative vehicle at the ad

hoc tribunals has become formally entrenched in the applicable law of the ICC, and
infuses other sources.

While no one would disagree that international human rights

norms must inform international trials, Article 21 has taken the unprecedented step of
raising all such norms to the levels of a quasi-constitutional status in a manner that can
allow the judges of the ICC to effectively rewrite international criminal law with the
stroke of a pen. Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute "mandates that the interpretation of the
Statute should 'be consistent with internationally recognized human rights'. Though this
phrase obviously refers to the rights of the accused, it can also be read to include the
rights of the victims, which opens the do or to a more aggressive mode ofprosecution.,,228
Under this view, with respect to the accused, the 'application and interpretation' of the
sources of law in Article 21 (1) must be consistent with human rights, such that
"procedural mIes must be constmed so as to not infringe the right to a fair trial"?29 More
controversially, Article 21(3) may have the effect of "authorizing the Court to hold such a
norm [that is in violation of internationally recognized human rights] to be 'ultra vires'
and thus inapplicable.,,23o Notably, Article 21(3) does not simply refer to jus cogens
norms, or even "fundamental human rights, traditionally quoted as examples of
preemptory mIes, but to all internationally recognized human rights.,,231

228 George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, "Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the
Darfur Case" (2005) 3 Journal oflnternational Criminal Justice 539 at 552 (Westlaw).
229
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Pellet, supra note 200 at 1081; see also George E. Edwards, "International Human Rights Law
Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy" (2001) 26
Yale Journal oflnternational Law 323 (Lexis); see contra Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 14-5.
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With respect to humanitarian protection, there are several provisions in the ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence that have already relied on Article 21(3) of the Statute to extend
humanitarian protection based on internationally recognized human rights. Allowances
are made for the testimony of victims of sexual violence in Rule 72 of the ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, based in part on the need to comply with internationally
recognized human rights?32 Likewise, Rule 145(2)(b)(v) of the ICC Rules of Procedure
and Evidence identifies as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing: the "[c]ommission
of the crime for any motive involving discrimination on any of the grounds referred to in
article 21, paragraph 3".233

From an institutional perspective, a formaI division has been created in the Rome Statute
between judges with criminal law backgrounds and those with international law
backgrounds. There will be no unified bench at the ICC. The appointment of judges at
the ICC departs from the practice of the modem ad hoc tribunals which merely required
sufficient geographical distribution as the dominant eriteria, by replacing it with subjectmatter expertise as the main determinate of judicial appointments. 234 Article 36 of the
Rome Statute requires that every candidate for election as a judge be either an expert in
criminallaw and procedure or in internationallaw, such as international humanitarian law
or human rights?35 If this were not blatant enough, the candidates for judicial office are
segregated into these two camps, appearing on separate 'lists' from which a proportion of
232
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nine criminal law-qualified judges is selected for every five international law-qualified
judges. 236 The brand of being a 'criminal law judge' or an 'international law judge'
remains even after their election. Article 39 of the Rome Statute on the composition of
Chambers states:
[ ... ] The assignment ofjudges to divisions shaH be based on the nature of the functions to
be performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges elected
to the Court, in such a way that each division shaH contain an appropriate combination of
expertise in criminallaw and procedure and in international law. The Trial and Pre-Trial
237
Divisions shaH be composed predominantly of judges with criminal trial experience.

The practical justification for this rule may be valid, but it has the very negative sideeffect of formally entrenching and, perhaps, exacerbating a fundamental conflict of vision
behind the international criminal law tradition - pitting two groups within it against one
another. While neither body of judges can be taken to be monolithic in their views, there
is a risk of that the ICC will over time develop a highly polarized bench of the type that
took place in the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Erdemovié. This would be a regressive step
in the development of international criminal law that would cast doubt on its legitimacy
as law. One solution is to favour judicial candidates who are qualified as experts in
'international criminal law' over time, rather than 'criminal law', or 'international law',
such that they qualify for both lists. Over time, such candidates will grow in number.

Ongoing Role of Transnational Common Laws
Recalling that one of the aims of Article 21 of the Rome Statute is to fill gaps in the law,
and given that Glenn's theory of transnational common laws operates to fill gaps where
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there are no particular rules applicable,238 the question that must be answered is whether
Article 21 opens the door to resort to such transnational common laws. At least from a
theoretical perspective, an affirmative answer may be reasonably given to this question.
More troubling, however, is that the final element of Glenn's theory is given a home in
Article 21, namely, that different law may apply to different accused. In the context of
criminal proceedings this is a challenge to the rule of law.

Given that Article 21 is a hierarchical delineation of sources of law, the final source of
last resort is where we must look for transnational common laws to operate. Article
21(1)(c) provides as a last resort that the ICC shall apply "[ ... ] general principles of law
derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.,,239

Despite

complaints of complexity in this articulation, there is an emerging consensus in the
literature that this provision confers "a wide discretionary power,,240 on the judges, "will
provide ample opportunities for judicial creativity",241 "allows the ICC to resort to
drawing inspiration from case law in the criminal field decided by national courts of the
various legal systems of the world",242 and leaves it to judicial discretion to determine
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which legal systems they will consider243 with the most likely candidates being "reduced
to a small number in the contemporary world: the family of civil-Iaw countries, the
common law, and, perhaps, Islamic law.,,244 These views aggregate to make a powerful
case that the basic characteristics of transnational common laws exist in Article 21 (1)(c)
of the Rome Statute: that they are non-binding but persuasive laws, that may fill gaps
where particular law is silent, and depend on collaboration among judges.

This leaves the most controversial aspect of Glenn's theory of transnational common laws
to be considered: namely, that it contemplates the possibility of different law applying to
different people. As noted in Chapter 2, this characteristic has not been clearly operating
in this tradition in the pasto However, Article 21(1)(c) of the Rome Statute may have
brought it home, by allowing resort to "the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime".245 The drafting history ofthis provision sheds sorne
light on what is meant by the States that would 'normally exercise jurisdiction'. An
earlier proposaI identified these as "first to the national law of the State where the crime
was committed, second to the laws of the State of nationality of the accuse d, and third to
the laws of the custodial State.,,246 Given that this specific proposaI was considered, but
not adopted, it could also reasonably be held that based on passive personality jurisdiction
under intemationallaw, the nationallaws of the victim's State could also be consulted in
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the case of an international armed conflict, systematic attack, or genocide?47 It is not
possible to interpret Article 21 (1)(c) of the Rome Statute to authorize applying the
particular law of on1y one of the se States, since it refers in the plural to that 'nationallaws
of States'. Therefore, Article 21(1)(c) would operate to fill gaps first by considering legal
systems (or traditions) of the world seeking broad consensus. If it did not find such
agreement, as in Erdemovié, then it would examine the smaller subset of nationallaws
that would ordinarily apply on the facts of the particular case. While there could be
multiple national laws applicable, in cases of non-international armed conflicts, it is
conceivable that only one State would normally have jurisdiction.

For example, in the Uganda situation presently before the ICC, where a perpetrator is a
f

member of the Lord' s Resistance Army and a Ugandan national, the conflict is in
northern Uganda, the victim is a Ugandan child soldier, and if the accused is apprehended
and held in custody in Uganda before transfer to the ICC, then only Uganda would
'normally exercise jurisdiction' - only Ugandan law would be applicable as a last resort.
In the end, however, it could be rendered inapplicable if it is "inconsistent with this
Statute and with internationallaw and internationally recognized norms and standards.,,248
For example, a mIe of Ugandan law which violates international norms would be
inapplicable.

This would be the ultimate situation of non-liquet.

There would,

theoretically, be no answer. If, however, the Ugandan law met this requirement, it would
be applied by the ICC. In a case dealing with another non-international armed conflict,

Universal jurisdiction is not relevant here since it simply bring us back to the earlier broad analysis of
legal systems of many States.
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that law could be applicable. We are thus faced with the possibility of different law
applying to different accused.

For scholars that have seriously considered this provision's implications (and there are
not many), there has been an allergie reaction to this possibility but they have fallen short
of recognizing that Article 21 has the potential to undermine the rule of law?49 Margaret
McAuliffe de Guzman, for example, notes that this "particularized approach would
undermine the consistent application of the law to different accused.,,250 Jose Alvarez
also argues against the possibility of specifie national law being ultimately of last resort,
but provides no basis for his argument: "It appears that what is contemplated is the
comparative use of local law - that is, that judges look to the body of locallaws in general
in order to infer commonly accepted principles among a variety of legal systems. The use
of, for example, pre-existing Rwandan law as to the definition of 'complicity,' if the acts
are committed by a Rwandan national within Rwanda, is not apparently authorized.,,251
Even if we assume that Alvarez is correct in assuming that complicity could not be
defined based on the other sources of law in Article 21, he fails to identify which States,
other than Rwanda, would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction in his examples - thus bringing
Before considering these reactions, it is notable that at least one State has issued a reservation to the
Rome Statute which expressly caUs on the ICC to apply its national law when sentencing its nationals for
any crimes of which they are convicted.
249
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their national laws into the analysis. It appears that his argument is not grounded in
Article 21, but on a reaction to its probable outcome. Again, there is a denial in the
literature surrounding Article 21 to recognize it for what it is. This brings us to the final
major implication of Article 21 for the international criminallaw tradition.

Nature of Prior Decisions of the ICC Indeterminate
A decision will need to be made by the ICC as to whether it will tolerate different law
applying to different accused, or if after it makes the very first 'particularized' decision
based on the subset of nationallaws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction, it
will opt instead to follow that decision in future cases as enabled under Article 21 (2).
The wording of this provision on the nature of prior decisions of the ICC is otherwise
quite uninteresting, at least on first blush: 252
The Court may apply princip les and mIes of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 253

It has been recognized that this is a "discretionary use of precedent [ ... that] represents a

compromise between the common law approach to judicial decisions as binding
precedent, and the traditional civil law view that judicial pronouncements in specifie
cases bind only the parties to the court.,,254 Sorne commentators have predicted that the
"Obviously, it would be sheer nonsense to affirm that the Court is forbidden to apply princip les and mIes
as interpreted in its previous decisions": Verhoeven, supra note 202 at 13.
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ICC will simply adopt the same approach as the modern ad hoc tribunals, discussed in
Chapter 2, to the treatment oftheir past decisions. 255

It is possible that Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute carries more significant implications

for the international criminal law tradition than has been envisaged so far. The first
possibility, which is the approach of the modern ad hoc tribunals is to build a body of
jurisprudence over time that initially draws heavily on sources external to the tribunal s,
but increasingly relies over time on the tribunal's own jurisprudence, looking outside
their walls only to filliacunae. This is also inherent in the tailored doctrine of precedence
developed by the modern ad hoc tribunals, discussed in Chapter 2, such that an
international criminal court "should follow its previous decisions, but should be free to
depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.,,256 This standard is far
more stringent than that appearing in Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute, which is
completely permissive in apparently allowing the judges to disregard or apply their prior
decisions at will. It would be open to the judges at the ICC to follow the lead of the
modern ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, many expect that "the ICC will facilitate the uniform
and consistent application of international criminal law. By rendering judgments in
concrete cases and developing a consistent jurisprudence, the ICC may clarify and even
develop international criminal law.,,257 In this way, Article 21(2) of the Rome Statute
would increasingly operate over time, as the ICC begins to decide issues in concrete
cases, to resolve legal issues without resort to the other sources of law in Article 21 (1 )(b)-
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(c). This would suggest a phased development of the ICC' s jurisprudence, and a graduaI
closing of the porous borders of international criminallaw to other legal traditions.

The second possibility would be for the ICC to rely on Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute,
likely in conjunction with Article 21(3), to proactively improve and develop international
criminallaw with only a 100 se concept of precedence. Any prior decision with which the
judges simply did not agree based on prevailing human rights principles could be
disregarded. A dynamic normative order would be created, constantly adapting to new
situations and conflicts. This possibility would be fully justified based on the wording of
Article 21.

In either of these models, the ICC has the potential through the operation of Article 21 (2)
to bring into existence "a new legal order of internationallaw,,258 - invoking the language
used by the European Court of Justice to de scribe its sui generis character.

Conclusion
It has been recognized that Article 21 of the Rome Statute "bears the marks of the rush

with which it was drafted and the process of compromise, which are ominous for its
credibility.,,259 Whatever final conclusion on the merits of Article 21 of the Rome Statute
one may reach, a critical examination of its theoretical underpinnings in light of the
origins and development of international criminal law, reveals that it has significant
ramifications for this emerging legal tradition.
258

Pellet, supra note 200 at 1053.

259

Ibid., at 1083.
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Sustaining the International Criminal Law Tradition

As has been seen, the normative super-structure that it purports to transplant into the
international criminallaw tradition differs in several important ways from earlier attempts
to identify sources of law in this tradition. Article 21 of the Rome Statute removes the
anchor of public international law that previously enabled international criminal law to
develop, albeit with problems of its

OWll.

Article 21 differs in ways which will have an

uncertain outcome on judicial decision-making in concrete cases, and threatens to
undermine the rule of law by approving of different norms applying to different
individuals. It also fails on a theoretical analysis to fulfill its aims of serving a gap filling
function. The course of development of international criminal law before the ICC has
been left to the discretion of the judges in many significant ways, despite formaI attempts
to limit their powers to do so. The operation of Glenn's transnational common laws
remains the dominant explanatory vehicle to explain how judges at the ICC willlikely
address gaps in applicable law.

From an institutional standpoint, the ICC as a permanent judicial institution charged with
applying Article 21 of the Rome Statute has entrenched cleavages through the process of
appointment and empanelling judges which formalizes the tension between enhancing
humanitarian protection versus maximizing fairness to the accused. This tradition would
benefit from a clear and honest debate about these competing tensions and how they
affect outcomes in concrete cases.
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International criminal law' s emergence in the wake of the darkest periods of human
history has placed pressures on it that few other areas of law have had to endure. It was
forced to hold trials in advance of a clear articulation of what law the judges hearing those
trials were to apply.

The legitimacy of such an exercise after WwrI faced serious

challenges that have only resurfaced as Article 21 of the Rome Statute has attempted
anew to refashion the normative structure underlying international criminallaw. These
challenges include the need to transcend often divergent nationallaws within untested and
ad hoc institutions. In many instances international criminal law is at the intersection of

weIl established legal traditions, most notably the common law and civilian traditions.
This thesis has demonstrated that these established traditions do not simply apply as
sources of customary international law, but as transnational common laws that are
persuasive, non-binding, and derived by judges of international criminal tribunals in a
highly discretionary manner in difficult cases. The benefit of ad hoc institutions is that
we can leam from them and adapt, such that new generations of institutions may be
crafted and improved upon.

A major drawback of the creation of a permanent

international criminal court is that prospects for reform are likely to be less expedient as
institution inertia sets in over the years.

At the root of the discretionary selection by judges among the possible sources of norms
is a competition between fundamental principles in the international criminal law
tradition. On one hand, there is the need to enhance humanitarian protection to victims, an
ideal embedded in international humanitarian law and particularly the Martens Clause.
On the other hand, there is the aim of maximizing fairness to the accused, an ideal
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enshrined in the growing body of international human rights law and codified in Article
21(3) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. This contest of values has been the pivotaI tuming
point in resolving legal issues before the modem ad hoc tribunals in several difficult cases
where the traditional sources of law have failed to provide an answer. In sorne of these
decisions, this dilemma has been laid bare in the reasoning of the judges, whereas in
others it has been kept hidden from stated reasons.

It is a finding of sorne significance that international criminal tribunals historically could

not simply rely upon the general sources of public international law in resolving difficult
cases. Even public internationallaw failed to pro vide a sufficient anchor to international
criminal law. It is perhaps even more significant looking forward that Article 21 of the
Rome Statute of the ICC ends the monopoly of these general sources of public
internationallaw that were supposedly the foundation of the jurisprudence of the modem
ad hoc tribunals, replacing it with a new normative regime that is highly variable and
indeterminate.

As has been shown on a theoretical basis, Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the
institutional design of the ICC have not resolved fundamental tensions and challenges
inherent in the international criminallaw tradition. Rather, they have exacerbated these
ideological conflicts. Despite seeking to serve a gap filling function, Article 21 may fail
to do so satisfactorily. While re-crafting the relationship between international criminal
law and other national legal traditions, Article 21 serves to broaden the ability of judges
to resort to transnational common laws.

The ongoing development of international

criminallaw is an open question due to Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute, which leaves it
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to the judges of the ICC to determine whether to adopt a system of non-binding
precedence, or to opt for a dynamic jurisprudence which evolves in accordance with
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute to reflect changes in internationally recognized human
rights. This means that until the ICC definitive1y and consistently articulates its position
on the precedence of its decisions, the strength of the rule of law will be in doubt in its
jurisprudence.

Finally, the institutional design of the ICC only serves to deepen

cleavages between the principles of enhancing humanitarian protection and ensuring
fairness to the accused.

These insights lead to are as for further research as the work of the ICC begins in earnest
and the modem ad hoc tribunals move towards completion.

In particular, while a

theoretical examination of Article 21 of the Rome Statute has revealed the prospect that it
falls short of an ability to fill gaps in difficult cases, this hypothesis remains to be
examined on an empirical basis. The ability of Article 21 to succeed in meeting both of its
animating justifications (Le. normative super-structure, and gap-fi1ling) requires an
empirical analysis of representative 'test cases' in light of Article 21. Whether Article 21
opens the door to resort to transnational common laws from an empirical perspective
could also be considered in the se 'test cases'. This could involve a practical application
of Article 21 of the Rome Statute to resolve the type of substantive, procedural and
evidentiary questions that will like1y come before the ICC. This exercise of resolving
representative 'test cases' by resorting to Article 21 could offer rich insights into the
viability of this provision to provide a sufficient normative super-structure for the
international criminallaw tradition.

100

Conclusion

A great deal of trust has been placed in international criminal law. There are high but
sometimes shaken expectations in its ability to administer international justice in a fair
and efficient manner, while being receptive to national laws as well as emerging
international human rights standards. These aspirations will be better served if more
attention is paid to the foundational aspects of this emerging legal tradition which has
been given a degree of permanency in the ICC.
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Statute of the International Court of Justice

Article 38

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shaH apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shaH not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono, ifthe parties agree thereto. 26o

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Article 31 - General rule of interpretation

1. A treaty shaH be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.

260

IC] Statute, supra note 31, art. 38.
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2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shaH comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between aH the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.

3. There shaH be taken into account, together with the context:

(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c) any relevant mIes of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.

4. A special meaning shaH be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.

Article 32 - Supplementary means of interpretation

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to article 31:
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(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable?61

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Article 10

Nothing in this Part shaH be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or
developing rules of internationallaw for purposes other than this Statute.

***
Article 21
Applicable law

1. The Court shaH apply:

(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;

(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international
law of armed conflict;

(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from nationallaws of
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States
that would normaHy exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and
internationally recognized norms and standards.
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Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, supra note 91, arts. 31-32.
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2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted m its prevlOUS
decisions.

3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent
with intemationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status?62
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ICC Statute, supra note 37, arts. 10,21.
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